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                                                ABSTRACT 
 
This study is about the activities of labour intermediary agents in Tema, a port city and 
the hub of industrial activities in Ghana. The study set out to understand the extent to 
which recruitment arrangements with intermediary labour agents by employers affect the 
employment relations of temporary or casual workers in the study area.  
Theoretical and empirical discourses on informalisation of work and flexible labour 
strategies constituted the frame for the study. Four intermediary labour agencies/agents 
were selected for interviews. A total of 24 casual/temporary workers from the 4 
agencies/agents were included in the interviews. 
Employment arrangement through intermediaries is emerging in Ghana. However, the 
nature of some of these labour intermediaries reveals that the processes underlying their 
current form are not new. Some of them have adopted and adapted some of the old ways 
of organising and managing casual workers into their operations. The insertion of labour 
intermediary agencies/agents into the recruitment process at the study area has had a 
contradictory effect on the actors involved - there are gainers and losers. The actors who 
gain from the whole arrangements are the labour intermediary agencies/agent and their 
clients. Contrary to the thinking that hiring of labour through an institutionalised agency 
leads to the formalisation of work, the situation in Tema points to deepen insecurity of 
temporary or casual work negotiated through agents; manifesting itself in increasing 
work irregularity, irregular and decreasing size of wages and other benefits, risky 
working environment and the drudgery nature of work. In the process, some individuals 
have lost their privilege positions whilst those who used to occupy the lower echelons of 
the casual labour market have been pushed further to the bottom of the barrel. All these 
have tended to worsen the conditions of the temporary or the casual workers. 
Opportunities, however, exist either in the form of scaling up of some of the casual 
groups in Tema to embark on public action to cause a change in their employment 
conditions or the intermediary labour agents/agencies improve on their operations to 
enhance the conditions of the workers they supply.  
 v
                                                               Chapter One 
                                                     Introduction 
 
Formal sector employment in Africa is noted to be stagnating or shrinking in relation to 
an expanding informal sector employment with the latter associated with worsened 
employment conditions of varying dimensions. The informal sector expansion has been 
attributed in part to the massive public (formal) sector redeployment and retrenchment in 
the 1980s within the broader context of adjustment programmes. 
        The informal sector is considered a dynamic and autonomous safe haven for the 
unemployed, the redeployed and the retrenched. The assumption here is often that the 
informal realm is independent of the formal economy but the informal realm, in reality, is 
considered to be linked to the formal economy in a variety of ways. The actors in the 
formal economy are believed to be increasingly relying on informal ways of recruitment 
through intermediary labour agents or contractors for the supply of unskilled, semi-
skilled or sometimes skilled labour with varying implications on the conditions of 
employment. This study does not intend to look into the whole realm of the Ghanaian 
urban informal economy. Instead, the focus is on that minuscule aspect of the informal 
realm - the flexible informal labour - who is being recruited through certain arrangements 
with intermediary labour agents.  
        A review of the literature on informality in Ghana suggests a lack of appreciation of 
these emerging informal labour arrangements within the current economic framework in 
Ghana. Yankson (1997), for instance, has expressed the need to undertake indepth studies 
into the effects of adjustment policies on urban employment, incomes and how 
individuals are adjusting to conditions of joblessness. The question that is raised here is: 
how well is the informal labour faring through their link with intermediary agents under 
the current urban economic environment? 
 
The study aims at, in reference to Ghana, obtaining an insight into the intermediary       
activities of labour hire intermediaries, and how their intermediary role influences 
employment relations and hence the security of employment of the informal/casual 
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worker and second, to get an understanding of firms’ motivations to adopt indirect hiring 
of labour through agents.  
 
The questions that the study seeks to address are:  
• What motivate workers and firms to seek the services of labour intermediary 
agents in their job finding and recruitment processes? 
• What are the effects of the intermediary role of the labour agents on the 
employment relations of the casual workers? Do the intermediary agents help to 
safeguard the security of employment and better working conditions for the casual 
worker?   
 
It has been hinted in the literature that public and private firms in Ghana are increasingly 
utilising flexible labour market practices e.g. subcontracting arrangements and contract 
labour which are making employment conditions more precarious (Ocran 1998). The 
modes of operation of, for instance, labour intermediaries, remain “hidden” both in the 
literature and in national discourse. The urge to undertake this study is therefore 
occasioned by this lack of an indepth understanding of the activities of intermediary 
labour agents in Ghana. This effort, small that it may be, would give an insight into or 
shape our thinking on this emerging form of employment practices to determine whether 
it represents a new ingenious way of creating jobs and also ensuring better working 
conditions or it has come to mean  the downgrading of labour. If temporary employment 
through agents represents a new ingenious way of mobilizing and managing informal 
workers, wouldn’t it then be plausible for their operations to be promoted for a wider 
impact? 
         I take the stand that intermediary labour agents constitute a cheap channel through 
which informal workers are mobilised and managed for the interests of firms. Their 
activities do not eliminate the fundamental issue of job insecurity.  Agency employment 
arrangements may facilitate a process whereby the services of the informal worker may 
be engaged on a permanent basis, however, this arrangement may not necessarily cushion 
them against deteriorating employment conditions - it may obscure or whitewash the 
realities of worsening employment conditions but not solve them. The insertion of agents 
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into the recruitment process of the informal labour has come to mean worsening 
employment conditions for the informal workers who subsist at the lower echelons of the 
urban economy. As it has been aptly expressed elsewhere, temporary employment 
through agents has come to represent a “regime of precarious employment, based on the 
institutionalisation of short-term, individualised employment relationships, greater work-
time instability and systemic underdevelopment” (Peck and Theodore 1998:656). 
 
The study is organised into six chapters. The introductory chapter gives a brief 
background to the linkage of the formal economy vis-à-vis the informal realm within the 
context of economic crisis and what it means for the informal labour. The objectives, 
motivation for the study and the research questions are captured in this chapter. Chapter 
two embodies the theoretical review situated within neoliberal and alternative 
structuralist explanations to informalisation of work, followed by arguments on flexible 
labour strategies, and ends with a brief description of labour intermediary agents. Chapter 
three houses the research method applied on the field. The macro context of informality 
in Ghana is constructed in chapter four, using the existing literature. Also included in this 
chapter are the characterization of Tema and the description of labour intermediaries as 
they pertain to the study area. The fifth and the concluding chapters are devoted to the 
analysis of the empirical data and concluding summaries respectively. 
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                                                  Chapter Two 
                                     Theoretical Review 
 
I attempt the theoretical discussion by looking at the historical trajectory and the various 
ramifications of informality as espoused in the literature in relation to the object of this 
study. Informality as a concept is complex, so are the interpretations. It dates back to the 
1950s (Portes and Schauffler 1993). The explanations to the process of informalisation 
have metamorphosed from the early marginalist theories to dualistic explanations 
(popular in the 1970s) and more recently to what has been labeled in the literature as the 
informalisation approach. As these perspectives may provide some explanations to the 
causes of informalisation, their universal applicability is problematic. The precise causes 
of the process are contextual, rooted in the specific society in which the process is taking 
place. In developing countries and in the case of Africa, informality has a history, that is 
the process of informalisation is influenced by pre-colonial and colonial forces to produce 
specific forms, and these forms are being reinforced by contemporary processes. The 
analysis would be placed within the context of mainstream and Marxist structuralist 
explanations on the processes of informalisation and work flexibilisation, taking note of 
discourses on macro and micro processes. In any case, micro processes (seemingly 
ignored by disengagement and informalisation perspectives) are, in addition to macro 
discourses on vertical relations with state and capital, part of the dynamics of informality 
(Lourenco-Lindell 2002). 
      The mainstream perspective has tended to celebrate the expansion of the informal 
sector as offering the opportunity for growth in the face of modern economic crisis, and 
that liberalisation policies would release the energies of the informal sector to flourish 
and hence would be able to absorb the excess labour in the economy. The implied 
meaning here is that making labour informal or subjecting labour at the lower echelons of 
the economy to market principles would ensure employment creation. This position has 
been challenged on the basis that it fails to conceive informality as part of a wider 
economic response to crisis (Meagher 1995). This takes us to the realm of seeing the 
informal labour as an integral part of the formal economy and not an isolated case. In line 
with this, there has been the recommendation for further studies, particularly in Africa, to 
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unravel the extent to which the informal sector is integrated into the national economy. 
Concerns have been raised that in Third World countries, the linkage between informal 
and formal economy have led to informalisation of work, which firms are using as a 
means of enhancing profits. The formal and informal interface is argued to have negative 
consequences for informal labour because it cheapens labour and also has a deteriorating 
effect on working conditions (Xaba et al. 2002). The informal realm is not a resource that 
is accessible exclusively to the urban poor in helping them to respond to urban crisis, for 
actors in the formal sector are also observed to be relying increasingly on informalisation 
as accumulation strategy.  
 
 Marginalistic and Dualistic Theses on Informality 
Some writers link the genesis of the informal sector, especially in Latin America and 
other developing countries, to rapid rural-urban migration which generated labour surplus 
in the cities relative to economic development after World War II. “Among the various 
schools of thought on the informal economy there is the agreement that a fundamental 
reason for its emergence was accelerated rural-urban migration and the labour surplus it 
generated in the cities”(Portes and Schauffler 1993:33).  
        The high labour force growth rate in the cities is believed to have been occasioned 
by economic development policies that had a strong urban bias. The import substitution 
industrialisation policy promoted during the postwar era combined with declining 
employment opportunities in the countryside of many developing countries instigated a 
wave of migration toward the few urban centres where industrial growth and employment 
were concentrated (Portes and Shauffler 1993).  
      Unfortunately, the rate of economic growth did not match the rapid growth of the 
urban labour force. The term marginality during this era was used to denote the exclusion 
of the migrant mass from the modern urban economy. This urban marginal mass was 
characterised as an “excess reserve army” that exceeded the labour reserve requirements 
of Third World economies and hence had no function for economic accumulation. The 
rise of the informal sector is attributed directly to excessive urban growth relative to the 
level of economic development in Third World countries, a process that is labeled as 
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‘hyper-urbanisation’”( Bairoch1973 in Portes and Shauffler 1993:38). Similarly, Breman 
(2004) has observed that: 
“The continuing flow of labour from the rural hinterland to the cities, without 
a related emergence of industrial production regime that determined the nature 
of social transformation in Western countries, makes it easier to understand 
why there was no rapid and striking improvement in terms and conditions of 
employment and in the quality of the workers’ lives.”  
 
The earlier theories on informality viewed the informal sector as traditional, offering bare 
survival on the margins of developing societies. This view has been criticised for failing 
to see the informal sector as having the potential for independent growth (Meagher 1995). 
The tone of these early theories failed to acknowledge the ability of the informal worker 
to adapt to the urban environment and survive in it (Portes et al. 1993). The marginalist 
view also rest on the assumption that with the advance of capitalist development in 
developing societies similar to what emerged in the West, the informal workers would 
acquire the skills and the experience required to secure better paid and more highly 
valued work in large companies and modern factories. This, it is argued, would lead to 
the eventual disappearance of informality or the expansion of formal employment. Far 
from disappearing, evidence over the decades indicates that the number of people 
working in the informal sector has increased rather than decreased. The assumption that 
an increasing pressure on the poor urban worker would be relieved by the rapid 
expansion of formal sector employment has proved to be ill-founded. On the contrary, 
while the exodus from the countryside continues unabated, their employment in the 
formal sector is being progressively eroded (Breman 2004).  
 
The neoliberal viewpoint on informality, which emerged in the 1970s, sees the informal 
sector as representing indigenous entrepreneurial dynamism with a potential for 
employment creation. This perspective which is very much defended by de Soto, and 
unlike the marginalist perspective, saw the origins of informality not so much to excess 
labour supply. In his view the informal actor is neither unproductive nor marginal, but 
something of an economic hero who manages to survive and even prosper despite state 
oppression (in Portes and Schauffler 1993). Meagher sums up this perspective as follows: 
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 “In contrast to earlier marginalist analyses, neo-liberal scholars discovered 
in the informal sector an indigenous entrepreneurial dynamism suggesting a 
potential for employment creation and growth. Rather than being treated as 
a product of  incomplete state intervention, the informal sector was recast as 
a victim of excessive intervention, which monopolised resources in favour of 
a small and inefficient formal sector, forcing the bulk of the population to 
meet their own needs outside regulatory framework of the formal 
economy”( 1995:262).  
 
The state was regarded as an obstacle to the promotion and growth of the informal urban 
sector. The policy recommendation that followed was that the state must be removed 
from the economy to give freer reign to the hand of the market (Portes and Schauffler 
1993). These views of market deregulation and the state’s roll back found audience in the 
policies promoted by the IMF and other international agencies (Porters and Schauffler 
1993, Meagher 1995, Lourenco-Lindell 2002). The case for deregulation of labour or 
informalisation of work, from the neoliberal standpoint, is linked to the argument that 
employment based on high security is rigid and as such inimical to the creation of more 
jobs, hence the failure of the formal sector, which is synonymous to secure employment, 
to create more jobs. The assumption is “that security of employment…is 
counterproductive to the creation of more work, [thus a] strategy not tamed by…state 
controls means that employees can be hired and fired according to the needs of the 
moment. Such a regime is seen as providing the best guarantee of sustain and 
employment-friendly growth” (Breman 2004:236-237). Simply put, making labour more 
flexible, insecure or organising labour in an informal way (not regulated by the state), is a 
precondition for employment creation. 
         Governments faced with domestic and international economic imperatives, and in 
line with neoliberal policies, are pressurised to remove labour regulations and cut public 
sector employment, all of which have eroded employment security and as a result firms 
are freer than before to adopt forms of organisation that draws on unregulated, cheap, 
nonunionised workers (Lawson 1992). Even in cases where labour regulations exist, the 
exclusion of the informal sector from labour regulation creates exploitable reserves of 
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informal labour (Meagher 1995). As Meagher puts it: “The failure of many African states 
to provide institutional support for the informal sector…is part of the logic of 
informalisation in the context of crisis - a logic based on cheap labour strategies for 
employers and survival strategies for workers” (1995:279). Kowtowing to deregulation 
policies by the state is argued to amount to state’s complicity in the whole process of 
informalisation (see page 12 for the role of the state in the informalisation process). 
 
The Alternative Structuralist Perspective 
The neo-liberal perspective is credited with the ability to recognise, in the modern context 
of crisis, the potentiality of the informal sector to play a central rather than a subordinate 
economic role. However, the Marxist structuralist theorists, also regarded as the 
informalisation approach, criticise the neo-liberal position on its dualistic tendency to 
present the informal sector as economically independent of the formal sector. The 
Marxist structuralist perspective neither sees the informal sector as isolated from the 
formal economy, nor considers the informal economy as a set of survival activities 
performed by destitute people on the margins of society (Portes et al. 1989). In place of 
the notions of economic dualism and marginality painted by the other perspectives, this 
alternative perspective describes unified systems encompassing a dense network of 
relationships between formal and informal enterprises. To this third perspective, the 
explanations to the process of informalisation lie in informal sector linkages (but not 
limited to it) with the activities of the formal sector within the context of modern crisis. 
The informalisation approach draws attention to the lack of analyses of the precise 
operation and impact of linkages with the formal sector, and class relations within the 
informal sector (Portes and Schauffler 1993, Meagher 1995). In connection with impact 
of linkages with the formal sector, Portes and Schauffler (1995) point out that the 
condition of excess labour supply created by rural-urban migration has had more complex 
consequences than the survival of the poor at the margins of the urban economy. These 
consequences are knitted with the functions that the informal enterprises play in support 
of modern capitalist accumulation. As it has been observed by Lourenco-Lindell (2002), 
merchant capital in Guinea-Bissau has been utilising informal relations, including poorly 
regulated labour and outlets as a means to deal with the challenges of economic 
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liberalisation and increasing competition, and in the process a number of urban dwellers, 
including casual workers, have been drawn into informal arrangements linked to global 
commodity circuits. She likens these informal modes of operations to strategies of 
flexible accumulation and informalisation being used by international capital in the 
industrialised countries. 
      According to Portes and Schauffler (1993), the existence of the informal economy 
represents a vast subsidy to formal capitalist enterprises, insofar as it makes labour cost 
lower than they would be if such sources of supply did not exist. Informal enterprises 
under gird the profitability of their formal counterparts by allowing the latter to maintain 
wage levels below the costs of basic needs if these had to be purchased through regulated 
channels. This notion, which is considered as old Marxist idea, however, is called into 
question, since informal actors are noted to be involved in a variety of capital/labour 
relationships, as employers, owner-operators and various forms of waged and unwaged 
labour other than disguised  petty commodity  producers who are exploited by capital or 
small-scale producers who subsidise capital accumulation (Meagher 1995). 
        The informalisation approach recognises the informal ways of organisation as part 
of capital’s search for flexibility in the use of labour with the aim of avoiding the costs of 
social security obligations and other substantial overhead costs of formal sector operation 
(Meagher 1995). Drawing from empirical evidence from Latin America, Portes and 
Schauffler (1993) indicate that there is a practice whereby large firms reach down 
indirectly into the labour pool to allocate a variety of tasks e.g. the (in)direct hiring of 
workers off-the-books, and subcontracting of production, input supplies, or final sales to 
informal entrepreneurs. The incentive for these linkages, they noted, is geared towards 
evading legal regulations that increase labour cost and decrease firm flexibility. The cost 
of the workforce of formal enterprises can be reduced by off-the-books hiring and 
subcontracting, which means profits can be significantly improved with varying 
consequences for the worker. The scenarios below illustrate this position:  
 
“Formal construction firms [in Mexico City] employ informal subcontractors 
who hire workers on demand in the shantytowns and nearby villages. 
Subcontractors commonly earn more than engineers or architects in charge of 
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the projects, but workers are paid close to minimum with few or no legal 
regulation and protection. Once a project is finished, workers are dismissed.” 
(Lomnitz 1976: 50 in Portes and Schauffler 1993). 
 
“…a new and disturbing feature has emerged [ in South Africa]…and that is 
the new form of informalisation by firms whereby workers lose their status of 
being employees overnight as they are given a so-called choice of becoming 
independent or voluntary contractors to the owner of the firm or be retrenched. 
This is done largely to evade the provisions of the new labour legislation which 
has been enacted in the post-1994 democratic dispensation.” (Fakunde 
2000:14) 
 
This formal and informal interface has unpleasant repercussions on the conditions of 
employment. As it has been stressed by Meagher: 
 
“The counterside of informality, little discussed by those who laud its flexibility 
and entrepreneurial spirit, are the long working hours, the poor returns, the 
prevalence of unsafe machinery and unsanitary premises, the alarming 
increase in the marketing of adulterated and expired goods, and the sale of 
contaminated foodstuffs - in short, the virtual absence of labour or consumer 
protection which generally function to limit profits in the interest of labour and 
society” (1995:277). 
 
In this way, “informal work is seen as integral part of global corporate economy and 
providing a crucial infrastructure for the major growth sectors of the ‘new urban 
economy’…[which consequently represents]…a disenfranchisement of the working class, 
a downgrading of labour and a worsening conditions of work” (Lourenco-Lindell 
2002:16). 
          The structuralist approach also holds that rigid legal codes protecting formal 
workers provides powerful incentive for firms to avoid expanding their labour plants and 
to make use, whenever possible, of casual labour and subcontracting (Portes and 
Shauffler 1993). 
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     The structuralists, however, do not advocate for complete removal of state controls 
from the labour market (Portes and Shauffler 1993). Greater flexibility, they argue, 
requires fewer constraints on firms to adjust the size and composition of their labour 
force in response to economic conditions, whilst at the same time allowing for other 
protective regulations on wages, work conditions, health and accident insurance, and 
unemployment compensation to remain. Their elimination would lead to a pattern of 
worker abuse, minimal wages, and disincentive for worker training and technological 
innovation. The result would not formalise the informal workers, but the informalisation 
of the entire economy, as work conditions in larger firms begin to approach those of 
today’s informal enterprises. To the structuralist, the removal of state controls would not 
help the consolidation and growth of micro and informal enterprises. The structuralists 
cannot assure us that instituting stringent state controls could prevent the process of 
informalisation. For instance, the introduction of stringent new labour laws since 1994 in 
South Africa is noted to have induced a new form of informalisation instead of 
discouraging it in the face of intense competition and crisis (Fakunde 2000). 
        By extension, one might say that capital always seeks avenues to thrive. When state 
intervention in the labour market is relaxed, it gives firms the incentive to informalise 
work which may be detrimental to the cause of the worker. On the other hand, rigid 
labour regulation, as South Africa’s case exemplifies, may also induce informalisation. 
Similarly, Portes et al. (1989) concluded from analyses gleaned from empirical urban 
informal studies that the expansion of the unregulated economy is the result of a reaction 
against regulation of the economy, both in terms of taxes and social regulations. They 
argued that the rise of the welfare state in the post-World War II may have promoted 
informalisation by directly stimulating companies’ efforts to escape their reach, and 
indirectly by weakening the resistance of the working class to a new form of work 
organisation.  Rigid regulation of the economy does not necessarily work magic for the 
working class since they may induce responses from capital which may be detrimental to 
the cause of labour. This therefore calls for a balance between ensuring some form of 
flexibility for firms to adjust in response to economic conditions, whilst ensuring at the 
same time that such windows for flexibility do not compromise unduly on the conditions 
of work. As Portes and Shauffler cautiously emphasized:   
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“Complete absorption of the labour force into the formal sector [or 
formalizing work] is desirable, but it will not occur without relaxation of rigid 
labour rules. Transformation of subsistence activities into dynamic 
autonomous small firms is equally desirable, but it will not occur through 
simple removal of state controls without sustained programmes in support of 
this aim” (1993:56). 
 
      Another interesting dimension with regards to (de)regulation vis-à-vis informalisation 
is the issue of informalisation within firms, which reduces the incentive by firms to 
externalise the process of informalisation. For instance: 
 
“In Brazil and Argentina, for example, a process of informalisation within 
factories, including widespread regression of labour unions, dismantling of 
employee benefit legislations, and reduced state regulation of labour practices, 
has reduced the need to subcontract” (Lawson 1992:15). 
  
 
The State and Informality 
 
Whilst the neoliberal perspective sees state’s intervention as an obstacle to the growth of 
the informal sector, the position of informalisation theorists is on the contrary. Through 
its policies of public sector downsizing and cut-backs in social services, which form part 
of economic restructuring within the context of crisis, the state is considered an 
accomplice in the expansion of the informal sector. Informalisation is not a social process 
always developing outside the purview of the state; it is instead the expression of a new 
form of control characterized by the disenfranchisement of a large sector of the working 
class, often with the acquiescence of the state (Portes et al. 1989). The spread of 
structural adjustment is pointed out as indication of the fact that the state has allied itself 
with the interest of local and international political and economic actors who find in 
informalisation a flexible solution to their own crisis (Meagher 1995: 280). “Informality 
is an expression of the states inability to control capital and those who own it” (Breman 
2004: 233). 
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       Some have describe the informal sector as a political creation – the argument being 
that the conditions necessary for the operation of the informal sector on a major scale 
demands the complicity of the state. The attitude of the state is also regarded as part of 
the problem of informality. Inconsistent or ambiguous policy, lack of policy co-
ordination, and policies that are difficult to implement, are argued to represent a state’s 
tacit support to the informalisation process. These attitudes necessitate the expansion of 
exploitative structures of informality, since they fail to provide active protection and 
support for informal actors (including minority groups), and provide gaps in the legal 
structure permitting stronger economic actors to exploit informal labour (Meagher 1995). 
 
Marxist structuralist approaches do not seek a single explanatory factor to the 
development of informality through economic factors only. Industry and economic 
related features as well as specific socio-economic features of a society combine to 
provide the necessary conditions for the growth of the informal sector. These features 
may have evolved as part of a society’s specific political and economic history, which 
accounts for the greater susceptibility of such societies to informalisation (Meagher 1995). 
Discussing it under the banner of downgraded labour, Portes et al. (1989) argues that the 
incorporation of informal labour into the capitalist production and their consequent 
worsening conditions of work is reinforced by their specific socio-economic 
characteristics. Such features are not limited to immigrant workers but extend to 
marginalised groups including, women, children, and vulnerable ethnic and minority 
groups. It is important to note that such features are grounded in history and place.  
Lourenco-Lindell (2002), for instance, has indicated that in the African context, 
informality has a long history and assumes specific forms deriving from the interplay 
between international capital and indigenous factors. She stressed further that the history 
of informality in African cities includes both various phases of capitalist penetration and 
evolved indigenous cultures and pre-capitalist forms of social and economic organisation. 
The unique forms that informality takes in a particular place are the outcome of particular 
intersections between external forces and historically informed responses. 
       Another dimension to the informalisation approach is the role of informal social 
networks in the deployment and control of labour in the informal economy. The issue that 
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has been raised borders on how workers are recruited and mobilised to co-operate or 
collude in unstable and often highly exploitative transactions in the absence of formal 
institutional mechanisms. Because informal activities operate outside the protective 
sanctions established by government and trade unions, the underground economy is 
particularly dependent on informal mechanism of control. These mechanisms consist in a 
set of social connections, personal and kinships allegiances, which ensure the flow of 
labour market information and which connect the employer to a supply of ‘trustworthy’ 
labour (Weiss 1987 in Meagher 1995). The factors of cohesion and shared norms of 
subordination provided particularly by social networks are vital for labour control in the 
context in which formal regulations do not apply and the exploitation of labour is intense. 
Meagher (1995) argued that social networks secure control over informal labour, not only 
by submitting it to market forces, but precisely insulating participants from the full 
impact of the market. This element of solidarity involved in protecting labour from the 
market and facilitating advancement exist within a context of sever exploitation. It is 
central to the logic of informal social networks that the co-operation ensured by the 
promise of future advancement is to the advantage of the employer, who is able to ensure 
his own accumulation on that basis. She concludes that in Africa’s informal economies, 
protection from the market through informal social networks provides some conditions 
for informal sector accumulation, but at the expense of high levels of informal labour 
exploitation and political vulnerability. Informal social networks, in order words are 
functional to capital accumulation (Lourenco-Lindell 2002). 
 
The discourses on the informalisation approach revolve around four main themes as 
identified in the literature and as could be discerned from the above perspectives on 
informality. They are; the linkages with the formal economy; the special characteristics 
of labour employed in informal activities; the state’s attitude toward the unregulated 
sector (Portes et al. 1989) and the issue of differentiation and the role of informal social 
networks in providing a framework for the recruitment and use of informal sector labour 
(Meagher 1995). 
         In addition to the above perspectives on informalisation, which are increasingly 
assuming ideological dimensions, Portes et al. (1989), have highlighted certain general 
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imperatives, though not very much different from the above discourses, as driving forces 
behind the expansion of the informal sector, especially in advanced countries. According 
to them, the expansion of the informal economy is due to the process of industrialisation 
going on in the Third World countries under social and economic conditions that forbid 
much enforcement of standards previously set by state. The newly industrialised 
countries, for example, are argued to informalise themselves vis-à-vis their competitors, 
as well as their own formal laws, so as to obtain a comparative advantage for their 
production relative to the more regulated areas of the world economy.                                                               
       The economic crisis since the mid-1970s throughout the world is regarded as one of 
the reasons for the growth of the informal sector. This crisis is believed to have subjected 
many to harsh living conditions that have made them accept whatever ways out of their 
misery they could find. This idea is considered both limited and general in attributing the 
expansion of the informal economy to the process of economic restructuring, which is 
aimed at overcoming the structural crisis of the 1970s. It is limited because the processes 
at work were in place before the crisis and general because it fails to clarify how this 
restructuring is taking place or identify the specific targets of the process (Portes et al. 
1989).   
       Informalisation of work is observed to occur not during periods of economic down-
turn only, but also during periods of economic boom. Fortuna and Prates (in Portes et al. 
1989) concluded from a study conducted in Uruguay that the boom period of export 
manufactures which entailed the use of advanced technology, and the growth in scale of 
production, fostered a process of informalisation disguised as small independent 
entrepreneurs. This process also led to de-skilling of the formal manufacturing labour 
force.  
       The informalisation process, whether in the form of subcontracting to home workers 
or resorting to indirect hiring through an intermediary is linked to the logic of shifting the 
burden of economic risk and uncertainty that derives from fluctuations in demand 
(Lawson 1992). For instance, the unprotected casual worker could easily be disposed of 
or hired in accordance with market and production fluctuations. 
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The consequences of informalisation, some of which have been discussed either directly 
or indirectly above, have both social and economic dimensions. Economically, the 
process of informalisation is considered to lead to the reduction of the cost of labour and 
hence contributes to the profitability of capital. The cost-saving feature inherent in the 
informal realm is connected more to the avoidance of indirect wage - in the form of social 
benefits and other employee related payments. 
       The social effect of informalisation is seen in the undermining of the power of 
organised labour in all dimensions - be it economic bargaining, social organization, or 
political influence. Undeclared, unprotected labour, small units of production networks, 
multiple intermediaries between firms and employers, homework rather than factory 
work are all factors contributing to the de-collectivisation of the labour process (Portes et 
al. 1989). In the same light, Peck (1996) has observed that firms’ resort to flexibility 
strategies is based on an attempt to individualise the employment relation, moving away 
from (institutionalised and therefore comparatively rigid) collective bargaining and 
negotiation systems in key areas such as wage-setting. Flexibility strategies do not always 
work in favour of firms in their resolve to increase their control over the labour process. 
It may simultaneously undermine other areas such as direct supervision or firm-specific 
skill formation (Peck 1996). 
 
Informalisation Perspective under Attack. 
The informalisation approach is criticised for its excessive emphasis on the 
subcontracting of productive activity to informal enterprises and homeworkers as the 
primary feature of informal sector expansion in the current crisis conjuncture as well as 
for its dominant focus on informal arrangements in manufacturing, and its consequent 
lack of attention to more numerically significant types of informal activity, such as 
services (Meagher 1995).  
         To other commentators, the informal sphere becomes easily associated with 
victimisation and the downgrading of labour and the range of explanations for its 
dynamics tend to be narrowed to the imperative of capital (and state). Attention is drawn 
to the need to consider the range of small-scale activities that are not linked dynamically 
to the capitalist sector. 
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         There is also a lack of consideration of the (differentiated nature of) social 
processes taking place within the informal realm, as the informalisation perspective tends 
to focus greatly on the vertical contraction between small informal actors and capital or 
the state (Lourenco-Lindell 2002). Even though Portes and Shauffler (1993) emphasised 
the internal heterogeneity of the informal sector, their analysis fell short of the internal or 
micro-processes that take place within the informal realm. The over-emphasis on 
attributing the heterogeneity of the informal economy to the articulation of the regulated 
and unregulated activities, according to Lourenco-Lindell (2002), amounts to locating 
power and exploitation exclusively in capital or the state which turns to obscure other 
sources of domination and a variety of contractions that are internal to the informal 
sphere.  
      Lourenco-Lindell’s (2002) position is that interpretations of informality should 
discard their apolitical and non-dynamic character and try to uncover instances of 
immorality, inequality and contradictions, and give consideration to perspectives that do 
not regard informal norms as given or passively followed - for actors in the informal 
economy may engage in unruly social practices. In her study to assess the extent to which 
informal urbanites in Bissau are faring in the face of economic deregulation, she came to 
the conclusion that micro-processes and multiplicity of agents at the horizontal level 
combine with vertical relations with the state and capital to explain the dynamics of 
informality. While acknowledging the worthiness of her critique on the informalisation 
approach, a closer look at her study indicates that her analysis does not add much to the 
core thinking of the informalisation approach. The novelty of her work is derived from 
the fact that she applied the informalisation approach (the same fundamental attributes) at 
a more micro level of study by way of dissecting to reveal the contradictions embedded 
in informal support systems which the poor is assume to possess to deal with 
deteriorating living conditions. In other words, Lourenco-Lindell sought to apply the 
same old attributes of the informalisation approach at a more micro scale of study. 
       Within the context of the articulation of the regulated and the unregulated regimes, 
the job is not completely done. The disputations against greater informalisation of labour 
vis-à-vis state and capital, fail to capture micro-processes and contradictions internal to 
the informal labour economy. If the informal labour regime has come to stay, we need to 
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know its nature, particularly in Africa, and the specific processes that go on within this 
regime. Do informal flexible labour strategies (e.g. recruiting externally through 
intermediaries) necessarily lead to (hyper)-exploitation of informal labour by capital, as it 
has been portrayed in the literature? Are temporary work agencies, for example, not 
helping informal workers to obtain permanent and secure jobs instead of one-side 
association of labour downgrading to informalisation of work? Are informal workers 
equally positioned in the informal flexible labour economy? The last question raises the 
issue of differentiating the informal workers who are recruited by agents to understand 
the different micro-processes that influence their different employment outcomes. 
Horizontal employment relations combine with vertical relations with state and capital to 
explain the process of informal flexible labour economy.  
     
The External Flexibility Debate 
The views on external flexibility concept1 in the literature have been contradictory. One 
school of thought posits that externalising the labour recruitment process or hiring labour 
through intermediaries is a precondition for employment creation as long as it allows the 
firm some flexibility to adjust to uncertainties in the production process (Korpi and Levin 
2001). The counter view to this benign perspective is that adopting external hiring of 
labour is linked to firms’ need to increase their ability to hire and fire to reduce wage cost 
in accordance with fluctuations and uncertainties in the economy which brings in its 
wake daring consequences on employment relationships (Peck 1992, Lourenco-Lindell 
2002). At the heart of the flexibility debate is the issue of employment relations. Defined 
as the nature of contract, benefits enjoyed, job security, nature and range of skills 
acquired, and authority and control at the work place, employment relations connect to 
labour conditions both at work and home. Lawson (1992) argues that any analysis of the 
effect of flexibility strategies on labour conditions must be contextualised within 
employment relations. This presupposes that any employment arrangement that fosters 
good employment relations leads to the upgrading of labour and vice-versa. At the centre 
                                                 
1 Labour is sought through strategies such as the deployment of part time work and temporary workers that 
enable rapid quantitative adjustments to the labour intake to be made in accordance with fluctuating 
production needs (Peck 1992:327) 
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of this study is the extent to which the activities of intermediary Labour Hire agents 
impact on employment relations and hence labour conditions. 
        A form of external flexibility strategies that have emerged in the West is what has 
been termed as the Temp-Industry in which firms are observed to be relying increasingly 
on them for temporary workers. Emerging evidence suggests that employers are 
increasingly using temp workers on a permanent or repeated basis, whilst in certain 
instances temp work is used by employers to screen workers for permanent employment 
(Peck and Theodore 1998, Forde 2001, Korpi and Levin 2001). In instances where 
temporary employment fails to generate an offer of permanent employment it may still 
provide a relatively continuous employment. Temporary employment in this respect is 
considered as a positive and necessary response to changes in the production process 
requiring increased flexibility on the part of firms. This positive perspective represents an 
oversimplification of the reality. Peck and Theodore (1998) have cautioned that in 
instances where there has been progression from temp-to-perm, the employment 
relationships still remain contingent. Their arguments are that: 
 
“First, the objective of subordinating labour utilization to short-run 
fluctuations in demand means that employment is at least potentially unstable 
and there is minimal tolerance of suboptimal job performance. Second, the fact 
that the wages and benefits packages of temp workers are invariably less 
generous than those of regular employees means that there is an increased 
likelihood that changes in temp’s personal circumstances (e.g. falling ill, 
picking up a work-related injury, or acquiring new care-giving responsibilities) 
will precipitate involuntary exit from employment” (Peck and Theodore 
1998:670). 
 
What the benign argument fails to recognize is the differentiated nature of the temp work. 
Temporary employment through an intermediary, whether at the lower or upper echelons, 
is constructed differently. They are “differently contingent: agency-client relations are 
conducted differently, allocation and reward systems are institutionalised differently, and 
labour control regimes are configured differently” (Peck and Theodore: 671). Whilst 
different temp industries may exhibit different logics, it is also true that temporary 
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employment may show varying employment relations in place and probably in time. The 
explanations to temp employment must therefore be sought in terms of place, time and 
type. Informal workers who are drawn into employment arrangements with 
intermediaries at the lower echelons of the urban labour market are not homogeneous. 
 
It is in no way suggested that the trends of temporary employment occurring in the West 
are similar to those occurring in developing countries, and in particular Africa. Whilst 
certain trends taking place in the West may be similar to the Third World context, casual 
employment arrangements in developing world have history and certain specific 
characters. In a study in India, Streefkerk (2002:146) observed that casualisation of 
workforce is “a long-term tendency rather than a recent development”, which adds 
credence to the point that work informalisation is not a recent phenomenon. A trend that 
has been occurring in the developing world is the formalisation of casual work through 
officially recognised labour contractors or agents (Endresen 2000, Streefkerk 2002). 
These labour contractors mediate between employers and the casual workers. To 
employers, this arrangement enables them to be flexible and to reduce the size of their 
workforce in times of economic downturn without provoking union activism, and also 
been able to shift the burden of controlling workers to the contractors. The agents derive 
their livelihoods from deductions from payments they make to the casual workers 
(Streefkerk, 2002). To the casual worker, the formalisation of temporary employment 
through agents is a paradox. Instead of their employment conditions nearing that of the 
formal employment, the reality is that the insertion of agents into the recruitment process 
exacerbates their living and employment conditions (Endresen 2000). The recruitment of 
workers through contractors leads to “further objectification of labour relations or greater 
social alienation” between workers and employers (Streefkerk 2002:147). In other words, 
rather than formalising the flexible labour regime through agent, it tends to informalise 
the labour relations of the informal worker. To put it differently, institutionalising the 
external flexible labour strategy tends to informalise labour further. A contention which I 
have been dealing with is why one should refer to employment through an officially 
recognised labour agent or contractor as informal, if informality is taken to mean an 
activity outside the reach of officialdom. 
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 In line with Breman (2004), I regard informal work based on the nature of the 
employment relationship. The labour intermediary agents and the employers may comply 
with official rules and regulations but the nature of employment agreement with their 
employees is informal. The workers are not employed on permanent or on regular basis 
and as such do not appear in the accounts books of the firms they work with. They work 
on the basis of mostly oral contracts - even in cases of written contracts; the terms still do 
not make them formal - agreed for an unspecified period of time with a sub (contractor), 
who reserves the right to terminate the agreement at any time. The only obligation with 
respect to the workers is to pay them a piece rate. This comes with little or no 
entitlements to social security or other similar provisions.                                                                                 
 
Labour Intermediary Agents -What are they? 
The nature of intermediary labour agents as espoused in the literature is varied. In India, 
individual jobbers or brokers have been identified to mediate between employers and 
labour. They are considered bosses of the work gangs they recruit (Streefkerk 2002). 
Lourenco-Lindell (2002) has also identified headmen (bosses of organised day workers) 
in Guinea-Bissau, who cultivate contacts with employers and negotiate on behalf of their 
groups. In contrast, there are also firm-like labour hire agents/companies who operate in a 
more formalised environment (Peck and Theodore 1998, Endresen 2000, Ford 2001). 
Labour intermediary companies are labour brokers who hire mostly semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers to firms for a specified period. They offer contracts to their staff which 
last as long as the contract between the labour hire company and its client exists 
(Endresen 2000). Emerging evidence in the literature suggests that labour intermediary 
companies do not merely supply casual workers to their clients but they are being used to 
perform “…labour process practices of induction and training, supervision, task 
allocation [and] performance monitoring [on-the site]…(Peck and Theodore 1998:665). 
Generally, the consensus in the literature is that employment through an intermediary, 
whether individual contractors or firm-like agencies, add to the precariousness of, or 
informalises, employment relations and hence worsens the conditions of contract or 
casual workers.  
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                                                      Chapter Three 
                                                 Research Method  
 
The fieldwork was conducted in Tema, an industrial and port city, between June and July 
2004. The goal was to collect data to help answer the questions relating to the activities 
of labour hire agents and how their intermediary roles influence the employment relations 
of the informal/casual worker. The actors who constituted the target of the study were the 
labour intermediary agents, the casual workers and the clients that patronise labour from 
the agents. The research strategy is pursued using qualitative approach. The interview 
questionnaire consisted mainly of open-ended questions (Appendix, 1). 
 
The labour hire companies were first to be contacted. Prior to the field visit, preliminary 
investigation was undertaken to obtain an idea of the number of labour hire companies 
operating in Tema. The labour intermediary agents were either a one-man labour 
contractor or a more formalised labour agency. They were Ghana Dock Labour Company 
(GDLC), L’aine Services Ltd, Domestic and House Helps Agency and National Fish 
Stevedores Association (NFSA) - an amalgam of individual contractors operating at the 
fishing harbour with each contractor having a gang or a group of casual workers working 
under him. A relative and his friend in Tema were very instrumental in helping to identify 
the labour intermediaries. 
        In the company of these people, I visited these labour intermediaries to fraternise 
and familiarise myself with them and to create the necessary rapport on the first day of 
the fieldwork. My gatekeeper, who is a famous dockworker at the port, led me to the 
premises of GDLC at Tema Main Harbour and NFSA at the fishing harhour, where I 
established contacts with certain personnel of these two labour intermediaries. They in 
turn made it possible for me to interview other informants. Ghana Dock Labour Company 
(GDLC) and L’aine Services Ltd are institutionalised labour intermediaries directed by 
board of directors and House Helps Agency; sole proprietorship agency. There are 
probably individual iterant labour contractors operating in Tema but they are difficult to 
be located. For instance, an interviewee casual worker working with a multinational 
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company indicated that it could be hard to locate, let alone to talk to, his  agent, “not even 
in his house, he does not keep one mobile phone and very sneaky”.  
       The gatekeeper to some extent helped to create the right environment by way of 
reducing any mistrust and suspicions that would have characterised the interviews. There 
was a big contrast between the responses provided by those agency officials who were 
interviewed on the spot and those I interviewed later on a set date. Whilst the former 
responded enthusiastically to most of the questions before coming to the realisation of 
their underlying intents, the latter were very caution and evasive in responding to some of 
the questions. 
       In all, I interviewed six individuals working with these labour intermediary agencies 
using mainly open ended questions. They included two officers from Ghana Dock Labour 
Company Ltd, two officers from L’aine Services Ltd, the proprietor of Domestic and 
House Helps and the secretary of NFSA. The questions they were asked bordered on the 
type of labour they mostly supply to their clients, who their clients were, the number of 
active workers they have in their book, issues bordering on contractual agreements, how 
the grievances of the workers are dealt with, control at the workplace and whose 
responsibility it is to ensure that work is done under good conditions and the mode of 
recruiting the workers. Repeated and sometimes reframed questions were asked at 
irregular intervals to check the consistency of the responses provided by these officers as 
well as the casual workers. 
 
A request was made to the officers contacted earlier to grant the permission to interview 
some of their casual workers. The officers of the Ghana Dock Labour Company (GDLC), 
admittedly, were very cooperative in this direction. The initial plan was to select 30-40 
casual workers for interview; however, this could not be achieved. The reason for the 
shortfall was a practical one. In my eagerness to obtain more data, especially from some 
of the enthusiastic respondents, I got carried away or got so much involved in the process 
that it stretched some of the interviews beyond 45 minutes. Also controlling open-ended 
approach to interviews is difficult. It is sometimes problematic to decide when to end the 
interviews, whether in the middle of the interview when the respondent is providing more 
useful information, or allow the informant continue as against his work schedule. 
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Altogether, I interviewed 24 casual workers from the 4 labour hire agents contacted, the 
majority of whom were selected from GDLC. Such a bias was as a result of the peculiar 
nature of GDLC to the object of the study. This bias is reflected in the empirical analysis. 
          It needs mentioning that the selection of the casual workers at GDLC was tailored 
to suit the peculiar nature of its labour arrangements. The casual workers are organised 
into a number of labour gangs and each gang is headed by a headman (who is also a 
casual worker). This came to be known as a result of my earlier visit to the agency. With 
this in mind, I consciously selected two casual workers from four of the labour gangs 
with two having been headed by experienced headmen, who have worked in the labour 
gang system for a long time even before the inception of GDLC. Four headmen, 
representing the four labour gangs were also selected for interviews. This on-the-spot 
approach was adopted with the aim of understanding the operations and the internal 
dynamics of the gang system before and after the inception of the GDLC. I have come to 
learn that in research, such as this, the best method is determined in the field implying 
that flexibility and not rigidity is the key. This is especially so since what may be 
conceptualised at the initial stages of the research design may be at variance with the 
reality.  Also included in the interview were the executive members of the local union 
(GDLC non-permanent workers of Maritime and Dock work Union), two of whom were 
casual workers. At NFSA, the casual workers were selected from two gangs operating 
under two different contractors. This study is limited by the small number of respondents 
interviewed, though rich in data. Also the interviews could not be extended to other gangs 
groups operating in other places and warehouses in Tema, which are neither under GDLC 
nor NFSA. 
        The questions designed for the casual workers were meant to elicit data on their 
characteristics, work history, their obligations to the labour hire agents, the frequency at 
which they were booked for work, issues on wages, benefits, contracts, working 
conditions, how their discontents are resolved and whether they view their current 
employment arrangements  with the labour hire agents as helpful. As it was expected, the 
responses and cooperation from the casual workers, unlike some of the officers of the 
labour hire agents, were encouraging. Unfortunately, I could not undertake the interviews 
at the worksites as intended. What I did instead, in the case of GDLC, was to undertake 
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the interviews under a big shed at the company’s premises where the workers gather 
every morning for work allocation and their subsequent dispatch to the worksite. It was 
here that I got the opportunity to interact with a lot of the workers. With regards to the 
other casual workers, I used my personal contacts to get them to meet elsewhere for the 
interviews. Also I interviewed some dismissed casual workers, who through one of the 
agents afore-mentioned, worked as factory hands for a multinational company. Some of 
the interviews were recorded on audio tapes with the consent of the respondents, whilst 
those who disallowed audio recording had their responses noted down in field note books.  
 
With respect to the client companies that patronise casual workers from the labour 
intermediary agents, only two managers granted one-on-one interview with me. Others 
took me through a marathon of bureaucratic procedures which meant their unwillingness 
to grant my request to interview them. I also engaged in some sort of informal 
conversations with some officials of the Trade Union Congress who have some 
knowledge on casual employment in Ghana. On the whole the responses from, especially 
the casual workers, and some officials of the labour intermediary agents, were 
encouraging. The cooperation from the client companies that utilises casual workers, 
except two, was least encouraging. This must inform the conclusions reached on the issue 
of firms’ motivations for hiring workers indirectly through an intermediary. However, 
certain responses provided by the casual workers and the labour hire agent to questions 
relating to the benefits the clients derive from their activities, pay roll administration and 
wages would partially help to address the firms’ drive for the services of labour 
intermediaries. 
 
I sourced secondary data in the form of academic publications, articles, labour acts, and 
dissertations from the bookshops, the University of Ghana libraries and public agencies. 
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                          Chapter Four 
 
The Context of Informality in Ghana 
 
An attempt is made in this chapter to account for the broader processes that connect to 
informalisation in Ghana, using mainly the existing literature. I share the wisdom that 
macro processes always cast their shadows on micro processes and that to understand 
micro issues is to understand macro issues. Informalisation of work in Ghana, I believe, 
is shaped by macro processes both at the national and the international levels. The macro 
processes may not provide a direct causal explanation to what is taking place at the study 
area. However, dwelling on national and international processes that explain 
informalisation in Ghana is important, in that it may give us an understanding of the 
broader context within which flexible labour processes in the study area is taking place. 
This chapter also captures the characterisation of Tema as well as the description of 
labour intermediary agents as they pertain to the study area. 
            The 1970s witnessed a series of studies into the informal sector in Ghana. Studies 
by Hart (1973), Aryee (1977) and lately Thomi and Yankson (1985), Yankson (1989, 
1998), Ninsin (1991), Baah-Nuako (1994, 2003) can be mentioned here. Most of these 
studies have been labeled as static and ahistorical, and much concerned with the 
description of the external characteristics of the informal sector, which turns out to give a 
shallow understanding of the dynamics of the sector (Ninsin 1989). An attempt by Ninsin 
(1991) to provide a dynamic explanation to informality in Ghana is also fraught with 
some weaknesses. Whilst his analysis assumed astatic and historical postures, he tended 
to over-attribute the processes of informality to national and international factors. In other 
words, he placed too much emphasis on the vertical relationships between the informal 
sector, the actions and inactions of the nation state, and international capital with little 
attention to the processes internal to the sector. The informal sector in Ghana is not 
amoral arena. The processes of informality must be sought both in vertical and horizontal 
relationships (Lourenco-Lindel 2002). 
      The intellectual interest in the informal sector became pronounced in the ‘70s 
(coinciding with the onset of the crisis) more so after Hart’s study in Nima, a suburb of 
Accra. However, the processes that explain the creation of the informal sector were far in 
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place before the economic crisis in the ’70s and the ‘80s. “The informal sector predated 
the crisis, even though it is transformed by it in a variety of ways… [it is a] phenomenon 
[that] is best conceptualised as been structurally linked both in origin and operations to 
the urban capitalist sector” (Hutchful 2002:21). The informal sector in Ghana is not a 
new phenomenon. Its origins are rooted in history. The analysis of the historical roots of 
the informal sector dwells heavily on Ninsin’s (1991) political economy analysis of the 
informal sector in Ghana. I attempt the construction of the context of informality in 
Ghana spanning three historical eras: Pre-1970s, the 1970s, and the contemporary era, 
covering both Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) eras.  
 
Informality during Pre-1970 Era 
I regard Pre-1970 period as the era comprising the colonial regime, the Convention 
People’s Party (CPP) government and the National Liberation Council regime. The origin 
of informal sector in Ghana is traced back to the colonial era. The educational system and 
the structural weaknesses of the Ghanaian economy during the colonial and the post- 
independent periods are regarded to have stimulated informalisation in Ghana. Ninsin 
(1991) has forcefully showed the interplay between the characteristics of the labour force 
(which were determined by the nature of colonial and post-colonial educational policies) 
and the economic system in shaping the informal sector. He argues that during the 
colonial period the education system was geared towards the production of white collar 
jobs as against limited occupational diversity. The colonial state was less concerned with 
technical and science education. The exception was the courageous step by Governor 
Guggisberg to encourage technical and vocational education. Though his educational 
policy achieved some success by way of the number of skilled artisans and craftsmen that 
were trained, however, as Ninsin puts it: 
 
 “…it is remarkable that the economy’s own structural weakness [made] it 
impossible to absorb even the modest output of those technical and vocational 
schools…The difficulty in obtaining employment after graduation obliged a 
number of the graduates of the technical and vocational institutions to take up 
jobs which were totally unrelated to their training…the cause of unemployment 
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among the skilled labour force lay in the fact that the colonial economy could 
not cope with the minimum changes in the composition of the labour force” 
(1991:45-46). 
  
The educational system of the immediate post-colonial era was not a great departure from 
those that were perpetuated by the colonial government in terms of content and 
philosophy – it was also meant to produce white collar workers to service the tertiary 
sector. The socialist government of Convention People’s Party (CPP), embarked on a 
massive educational reforms to increase access to education to as many Ghanaians as 
possible under its Accelerated Development Plan for Education. The expansion of 
educational infrastructure at various levels of the education system coupled with souring 
enrollment figures was remarkable. The CPP government did not only focus on the 
development of primary education but also extended the reforms to the higher levels of 
the educational systems. By 1957, when Ghana achieved full independence from the 
British government, the number of primary schools, middle schools, technical and trade 
schools and teacher training schools increased by 17%, 37%, 48% and 27% respectively 
from the 1952 figures. In addition, University of Cape Coast was started by the CPP 
government to train graduate teachers.  The infrastructural expansion during the same 
period (1952-1957) was accompanied with increases in the number of student 
enrollments with technical and trade schools registering 71%, middle school 36%, 
primary school 93% and Teacher training schools 39%. The universities registered the 
least student enrollment of 9% during the same period2.  
       The outcome of CPP education policy was consistent with the objective of the 
programme; the emphasis on primary school education and in addition technical and 
trade schools to train technicians and vocational workers, with the latter similar to 
Guggisberg’s education policy during the colonial era as discussed above. One difference 
between the CPP government and the colonial regime was that of numbers. The 
expansion of educational infrastructure and increases in student enrollment during the 
regime of CPP were momentous as compared to the colonial regime. Nevertheless, the 
education policies of both the CPP government and the colonial regime were “merely a 
                                                 
2 See Ninsin, K (1991:46) for the raw figures. 
 28
revolution in numbers rather than in the content and philosophy of education” (Ninsin, 
1991:47). Some of the concomitant fallouts of these educational polices were the high 
drop-out rates among primary and secondary students and the difficulty of finding 
employment for those who were able to complete their schooling. The obvious avenue for 
the dropouts and the graduates from the first and the second cycle institutions to seek 
refuge was the urban informal sector; 
 
“Such people’s level of education, however minimum or rudimentary… 
dislodged and alienated them from their immediate environment; and they 
would feel more inclined to trek to the urban centres…Also it is mostly 
members of this group who [were] more likely to become informal sector 
operators when they are unable to secure a permanent employment…it has 
been found that rural-urban migration is a critical factor determining growth 
in the urban population; that such migrants are mostly those with formal 
education-at least, elementary school education…Furthermore, one study has 
found that it is people such as these - that is those with least education-that are 
more inclined to settle in the urban…informal sector” (Ninsin 1991).  
 
       In the same vein, Hart (1973) observed that the high rate of unemployment in the 
sixties among the urban youth in Accra was in part a reflection of the influence of 
western education. The inadequacy of their qualification made it difficult for most of the 
school leavers to locate scarce white-collar jobs. The available option left to them was to 
compete with manual workers in the informal sector. 
         Paradoxically, the urban economy was not robust enough to offer the needed 
employment to the growing urban labour force. However, there were attempts by the CPP 
government to in part solve the unemployment problem by turning public boards and 
corporations into labour absorbing enterprises (Ninsin 1991) and through  the 
establishment Workers Brigade - a public sector, para-military organization (Hart 1973) - 
to provide employment to the unemployed who could not secure formal employment. 
There were some modest gains in the employment front. Notwithstanding these gains, the 
unemployment situation among school leavers could not be reduced significantly by 
these CPP government’s employment policies or its urban bias import substitution 
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industrialisation policy. Instead, the growth of the urban labour force outstripped the 
possible employment avenues. 
       The limitedness of the formal economy to absorb the growing urban labour force 
became evident through the retrenchment policy of the National Liberation Council 
(NLC), which succeeded the CPP government in a coup in 1966. This government 
embarked on retrenchment exercise to reduce the size of labour force in the public sector. 
In fact the justification for the retrenchment exercise embarked upon by the National 
Liberation Council (NLC) was based on the argument that the CPP employment policy 
increased the size of the public sector disproportionately without consideration to the 
ability of the economy to sustain such increases. It has been estimated that between 
February 1966 and January 1970, when NLC was in government, about 80,524 workers 
were laid off (Ninsin 1991). The majority of those who suffered from the retrenchment 
exercise were predominantly from the public boards and corporations, which accounted 
for about 75% of those retrenched and they were characteristically the semi-skilled and 
the unskilled component of the labour force (Ninsin 1991).  
         Those expelled from formal employment must depend on some sort of employment 
for subsistence. The urge to survive necessitates their resort to informal wage 
employment or self-employment. For many of those without formal jobs their condition 
dictates that they accept any job that comes in their direction. In line with this Twum-
Baah (1983) has for instance indicated that “…workers in marginal jobs also need 
productive jobs but their poverty and the need for income do not permit them to stay 
unemployed for long: [they must therefore]…take any job that comes up to survive”(in 
Ninsin 1991:58). Their economic circumstances make “it imperative that they should be 
engaged in some activity. Hence, the informal sector becomes their final destination in 
the economy. It is the ultimate destination because the [formal] economy has no room for 
them” (Ninsin 1991:58). 
 
The above historical perspective, which highlights the interplay between the content of 
education and the kind of labour force that were churned out of school and the failure of 
the modern economy to provide the needed employment for the mass of the labour force, 
in explaining informalisation in Ghana is significant in one sense. It resonates with the 
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marginalistic thesis that associate the origins of the informal sector to the high growth 
rate of the urban labour force (which in itself is explained by rural-urban migration) 
relative to the rate of economic growth. The expected employment opportunities failed to 
materialise from the modern economy to absorb the mass of the urban labour force 
leading to the emergence of an excess reserve army considered as irrelevant for 
accumulation. The deficiencies of this position are well noted. The dualist argues that the 
informal sector participant is not a marginal worker who subsists at the margins of the 
urban economy but someone endowed with independent ingenious abilities to survive the 
urban environment. The structuralists maintain that the excess reserve army is relevant to 
capital accumulation, and in fact directly linked to it (refer to the theoretical review in 
chapter one for detailed elaboration). This leads us to the discussion of informality in 
the ’70 during which most of the studies into the informal sector had this dualistic dent. 
 
 
The 1970s - The Discovery of the Informal Sector 
 
The 1970s is significant in the sense that it was the period that marked academic 
enthusiasm in the informal sector vis-à-vis the challenge to the absorption capacity of the 
formal economy to the growing urban labour force. As it has been shown above, the 
underlying factors of the unemployment crisis in the formal sector was in place before the 
‘70s. The post-1966 period ushered in unemployment crisis with the later perceived to 
have been caused partly by the employment policy pursued by the CPP regime by turning 
public institutions into avenues of employment without consideration to the state’s 
capabilities to support such bureaucratic ventures. To deal with the employment crisis, 
the military government of the National Liberation Council (NLC, which took power in 
1966) with its neoliberal gestures initiated a labour retrenchment policy in the expectation 
that the private sector would be able to absorb the growing number of people without 
jobs. The National Redemption Council (NRC)/Supreme Military Council (SMC) that 
succeeded Progress Party (PP) in a coup in 1972, embarked on indigenisation policy 
which saw many more labour retrenchments in the private sector (Ninsin 1991). 
Simultaneously, the NRC/SMC regime pursued an interventionist policy similar to the 
CPP government. It encouraged the rebuilding of the bureaucratic systems which resulted 
 31
in a high government expenditure instigated by inflationary financing (Yaro 2004).  
Earlier on, the Progress Party arbitrarily dismissed 568 civil servants in 1969. The 
cumulative effect of these labour retrenchment programmes in part underpinned the 
increased number of people who were without formal employment - call it increasing 
formal unemployment. The obvious alternative for those expelled from formal wage 
employment was to resort to informal sector activities. According to Ninsin (1991), the 
various entrepreneurial programmes initiated by governments during the seventies and 
beyond were designed first to deal with mounting unemployment problems and second to 
help those expelled from formal employment to get established in the informal sector. 
The political crisis, which manifested itself in frequent changes of governments by the 
vote of the gun from the late 1960s through to the late 70s, did not bring about a design of 
consistent programmes to deal with the unemployment problems since the various 
governments with different ideological dispositions placed different emphasis on how to 
tackle unemployment.  
 
In the wake of employment crisis in the formal sector, the Ghanaian informal sector was 
“discovered” as having the potential for income generation among the urban poor. 
Suffice to state is the study by Hart (1973) into the urban informal sector in Ghana.  
Hart’s study sought to discount the idea that the reserve army of people outside the 
formal realm is passive and exploited participant in the urban economy. Hart illustrated 
graphically, with empirical evidence on how the informal worker in Accra relied on 
varied livelihood systems to survive the economic exigencies in the city. This according 
to Hart takes the form of combination of multiple occupations, within and outside the 
formal sector, which offers a more lasting solution to the predicament of the informal 
worker. As Hart puts it: 
 
“[Informal work], often as a supplement to [formal] wage-employment, offers 
itself as a means of salvation. If only the right chance came, the urban workers 
could break out of the nexus of high cost and low wages which is their 
lot…[putting it differently] denied success by the formal opportunity structure, 
these members of the urban sub-proletariat seek informal means of increasing 
their incomes…[Truly those who call themselves] unemployed are those who 
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will not accept income opportunities open to them for which they are qualified, 
and this often means rejecting informal means of making a living” (Hart 
1973:67&83). 
 
Hart therefore defines employment not only terms of income opportunities offered in the 
formal sector but also in terms of multiple employment opportunities in the informal 
economy, with the latter offering employment promises for the urban mass without 
formal jobs. The issue that needs to be raised is whether the contemporary informal urban 
worker in Accra enjoys the luxury of combing formal wage employment with informal 
sources of income and whether or not “informal means” indeed ensure increases in 
incomes for the urban proletariat. At best what may be available to the contemporary 
informal urban worker are multiples of informal sources of income at the household level 
and single and intermittent informal sources of income at the individual level. Hutchful 
(2002) has observed that the onset of the crises in the 70s and the 80s and the subsequent 
minimization of state’s social responsibility have induced a shift of survival responses 
from the formal to the informal arena. In addition, the experience of casual workers in 
Tema also points to the lack of multiple sources of casual work and increasing 
irregularity of incomes (see the analysis in chapter five under regularity and sources of 
casual work section).   
       This optimistic view of the informal sector as providing opportunity for employment 
generation influenced subsequent studies into the informal sector in the ‘70s and beyond, 
often in collaboration with the ILO. This consequently informed the policies of 
government and programmes of international development agencies towards the sector 
with the aim to unravel the creative powers of the informal sector as a means of 
generating employment within the context of mounting formal unemployment.  In a study 
in Kumasi, Aryee (1977) concluded that the informal sector has the capacity for growth 
and employment generation. He however, pointed out that the realisation of such growth 
is inhibited by the very features of the sector, such as inability to meet large orders of 
goods and services on demand, low quality of products, one-man ownership instead of 
corporate ownership of enterprises and lack of technical know-how because of the sectors 
over reliance on apprenticeship system of training. Similarly, ILO considers the lack of 
growth in the informal sector to the weaknesses inherent in the sector itself and that 
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addressing these inherent obstacles is a precursor to the sector’s growth (see Meagher’s 
analysis 1995:262). This perspective of holding the informal sector as having the key to 
the problems of employment also became prominent in the’80s and ’90s and influenced 
subsequent studies into the informal sector (see Thomi and Yankson 1985, Yankson 1986, 
1998, Baah-Nuako 1994, 2003). In light of the perceived prospects of the informal sector 
to the revival of the economy, the government of Ghana was reported to have expressed 
the determination to nurture the sector as the “dynamo of growth, development and 
modernization” (Baah-Nuako 1994:6). In his 2005 state of the nation address, the 
President of Ghana mentioned the informal sector as the sphere, “where the turn-around 
of the Ghanaian economy must be pursued” and to achieve this is to make the sector 
formal with support from the state. These views on the informal sector are the very ones 
that are captured in the writings of Hernando de Soto. According to de Soto (2000), the 
vast resources or assets in the informal sector remain “dead capital” since the intrinsic 
value of those assets exists without formal representation. To empower the informal 
sector participants, then, calls for the transformation of their assets into capital and the 
way to do it is by formalising their assets. It is important to note that not all the 
participant in the informal sector have assets, many of the minority groups own little or 
nothing beyond their own labour and to such groups the formalisation of assets and 
possessions is in itself of little use (Johnson 2002).3
       As it would be expected, most of these Ghanaian studies, which are quantitative in 
nature and mostly describe the external features of the informal sector, have tended to 
romanticise the informal sector as having the key to solving unemployment and also 
concentrated their analyses at the enterprise level; oblivious of the conditions under 
which the informal employees are engaged in informal activities. What is the quality of 
employment generated in the informal sector? The growth of the informal sector in 
Ghana has not been even - it has given rise to dialectic of accumulation and 
marginalisation. In cases where attention has been drawn to informal sector employment, 
the focus has mainly been on apprentices, who according to Aryee (1977) dominate 
informal small enterprises in Kumasi, to the near neglect of other types of informal 
                                                 
3 Hilde F. Johnson, the Minister of International Development, Norway made the statement in her opening 
remarks at a seminar hosted by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to which Hernando de Soto was 
the keynote speaker on the theme: Formalisation of Property Rights in Eradicating Poverty(2002). 
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labour utilisation in Ghana. The exception, however, is the current study by Britwum 
(2002) into informal sector labour relations in rural Ghana in which she differentiated the 
informal labour types into family labour, child labour, co-operative labour pools, 
apprenticeship and wage labour (i.e. casual labour). She observed that the social space 
constituted the platform on which labour relation were contracted and operated with the 
advantage of humanising employment relations in the rural informal sector as 
distinguished from the formal sector which turns out to be exploitative in nature. In her 
view: 
“Employees and employers’ relationships were not distant or impersonal. In 
some instances, e.g. apprenticeship and seasonal casual labour would form 
part and parcel of the employers’ household and would be entitled to 
provisioning from their employers like all household members. Employers were 
expected to treat employees like humans and not abstract entities as in the 
formal sector. The impact of social relations on the work environment means 
that capital in the informal rural agriculture did not stand out as an 
exploitative factor in production as in the formal sector” (Britwum 2002:12). 
 
      Whilst on one hand, she recognised the non-exploitative nature of household capital 
in the rural informal sector, she on the other hand indicated how household relations 
influence family labour relations and hence the distribution of family resources. The 
distribution of household production and incomes are shaped by patriarchal domination 
embedded in traditional norms thus making wives and their female children more 
vulnerable. As she puts it: 
 
The…[marital] relation between husband and wife overshadows labour 
relations and tends to blur the wife’s rights as a worker…women have no 
labour rights [within the family]. The opportunity to negotiate the fruits of her 
labour depends on her good behaviour and not how hard she has worked to 
produce those fruits. The norms that compel women and children to work for 
free for the family male head are on the whole stronger than those that govern 
the distribution of the resources. Wives are no longer entitled to their 
traditional share of income from family production. Women are expected to 
earn their own income outside the family enterprise. The fact that labour 
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obligations are derived out of marriage makes it difficult for women to see 
their labour rights as distinct from their marital rights (Britwum 2002:12-13). 
 
        The informal labour relations constructed on norms and traditions may be 
advantageous to the informal rural employee in terms of earning a livelihood, however, it 
may also constitute a source for the appropriation of labour effort at the household level. 
Informal labour relations constructed on norms and traditions may not necessarily be 
non-exploitative. 
       The ability of the informal sector to generate sustained employment for the urban 
mass has attracted some skepticism since the “informal sector absorption of the 
unemployed tends…to be restricted to sectors which offer little more than bare 
subsistence” (Meagher 1995:268) with limited opportunities of entry into the more 
lucrative and profitable informal sector enterprises. Elsewhere in West Africa, it has been 
indicated that lower wages of informal sector employees are regarded as a factor in the 
accumulation process of informal sector employers (Meagher and Yunusa 1991).  
Informal sector employees, such as apprentices, are argued to represent cheap source of 
labour whose employment go to subsidise the incomes of masters. They are not just 
exploited by their masters; they are often denied wages (Ninsin 1991). In instances where 
they earn incomes, they are meager and often below the minimum wage, or payment in 
the form of support for upkeep in situations where the apprentice lives with the master 
(Britwum 2002) and often work for longer hours.  
       The 1970s, as it can be gleaned from the above, marked the intensification of 
unemployment crisis especially in the formal sector, but at the margins of the crises was 
the enthusiasm expressed in the informal sector to offer the needed employment to those 
willing to work but have no space in, or expelled from, the formal sector.  The economic 
crisis deepened in the late 70s and the 80s. The expulsion of labour from the formal 
sector continued and intensified with the implementation of structural adjustment 
programmes in the 1980s. In qualitative terms, the capability of the informal sector to 
generate and absorb the mass of the urban poor has been questioned under structural 
adjustment programmes during the 1980s. 
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ERP/Structural Adjustment Programmes and Employment in Ghana 
The economic crises in the 1970s and the early 1980s provided the background to the 
adoption of the IMF and the World Bank prescribed Economic Recovery and Structural 
Adjustment Programmes in 1983. In general, there was a decline in almost all the 
economic sectors with daring consequences on social life. By 1983 cocoa exports had 
fallen from a 33% share of the world market in the 1970s to 12% (Manuh 1994). Output 
in the mineral sector declined over the same period, from 25% to only 14% of earnings 
(Manuh 1994). Food sufficiency ratio fell from 83% in the period 1961-66 to 71% in 
1973-80 and to 23% in 1983 (Manuh 1994). All these occurred in the midst of high 
inflation; high annual population growth of 2.5%, shortages of essential consumer goods 
was rampant, and inadequate and/or deteriorating social infrastructure. 
    Coupled with the economic crisis was the drought and bush fires that destroyed vast 
exportable agricultural commodities and arable foods, which brought in its wake untold 
famine and hardship in the country between 1978-79 and 1982-83. This gloomy situation 
was worsened with the expulsion of over 1million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983. 
    In addition to the economic and environmental crises between the 1970s and the 1980s 
was the state crisis. Hutchful (2002) have identified several factors, though interrelated, 
that constitute the crisis of the state. He has referred to this crisis as policy crisis which 
culminated into a crisis of legitimacy of the state. The Ghanaian state during this period, 
according to Hutchful, was weak in mobilising fiscal resources from the society. For 
instance, tax collection dropped from 18.6% of GDP in 1970-71 to 6.5% in 1984. At the 
same time collection of domestic sales tax fell from 1.7% of GDP in 1970-71 to 0.4% in 
1982, which implied shrinking size of the state budget. Tax evasion reached alarming 
proportions. The poor fiscal position affected the ability of the state to perform regulatory, 
planning and implementation functions. He maintains that mass departures of skilled 
professional and budgetary cutbacks led to the collapse of key statistical, research and 
planning agencies. This was worsened by the breakdown of the central control systems 
and monitoring agencies in the Civil Service. In effect, the “shrinking capacity of the 
state in these critical areas was in turn a key reason for both the deteriorating quality of 
policy and the failure of the analytic work essential to adjustment” (Hutchful 2002:29). 
Another weakness of the state apparatus according to Hutchful was the incidence of 
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“ghost workers” (departed workers whose names still remained on payrolls), and this was 
so among the monthly-rated, non-established and casual workers, who formed as much as 
90% of the total wage bill in some government agencies.    
      Whilst there was mass departure of middle level manpower from the state institutions, 
the ranks of the junior and casual semi-skilled and unskilled labour continued to increase. 
Between 1975 and 1983, the bottom ranks of the civil service grew by 14%, even while 
shortages of inputs were leading to redundancy of existing staff (Hutchful 2002). 
Hutchful’s observation with regards to ballooning of the semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers in the civil service between 1975 and 1983 is very consistent with the 
bureaucratic and interventionist character of the NRC/SMC regime, which dominated this 
period, and draws some parallels to Nkrumah’s policy of offering employment to a 
number of young school leavers through public sector para-military organisations such as 
Workers brigade. It was this semi-skilled and the unskilled workers who were greatly 
affected by the retrenchment exercise under the adjustment programme. 
      The malfunctioning of the state apparatus led to the de-legitimation of the state. 
Long-term mismanagement of the economy and dispersion of national resources led to 
distrust and disrespect in the capacity of the state to manage the economy to the benefit of 
all within the civil society. The natural reaction to the state’s decadence by the 
marginalised groups was “to distance themselves from the state and broaden their 
autonomy” (Hutchful 2002:31). This Ghanaian situation bears resemblance to the 
disengagement perspective that became popular in the 1980s, and found resonance in 
neoliberal thinking. Hutchful adds that holding civil society against the state is 
misleading and naïve in the particular context of Ghana, because it was not the 
mobilisation of civil society but the inefficiency of the state apparatus and its coercive 
institutions that provided the grounds for economic and political change in Ghana in the 
early 1980s. It is still true that a civil society and marginalised groups disengagement 
from the state emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with the state’s inability to deliver to 
the good of the whole population. However, it is important to add that posing civil 
society against the state is not tolerated in current development discourse - the two are 
complementary. The informal sector could be treated as a product of inefficiencies in the 
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interventions of the state and not as a victim of state’s intervention. The role of the state 
should not be confused with the inefficiencies in the state’s apparatus. 
      The legitimacy crisis of the state in particular, coupled with the economic and 
environmental crises during the 1970s and the 80s, may have provided the impetus for 
the argument of state’s disengagement from the economic management thus preparing 
the grounds for the adoption of Economic Recovery and Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, which were to lay the foundations for the magic hands of the market to 
operate. The ensuing public sector restructuring also led most people to seek their 
livelihoods in the informal sector which had been discovered by neoliberal scholars to 
offer potential for growth. 
      The situation at the time caused the PNDC to turn about to initiate ERP/SAP with 
blessing from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (see Rimmer 1992, 
chapter 8). This is ironic, because the PNDC rode on neo-Marxist rhetoric and declared to 
commit itself to development based on self-reliance and delink the Ghanaian economy 
from the world capitalist system on assuming power in 1981. 
      The ERP was implemented in phases with the general aim of reversing the economic 
decline. The first phase, or the stabilisation phase, which was implemented from 1983 to 
1986 had the objectives to stabilize public finance, to remove price distortions, to restore 
producer incentives and to attract external aid. Subsidies on agricultural inputs, petroleum 
products as well as public utilities were removed. There were price incentives for the 
export sector. To increase the incentives to boost the cocoa sector, a 65% increase in 
cocoa producer prices was made. It was also meant to correct balance of trade imbalances 
through series of devaluations that would make imports expensive and adjust the value of 
the local currency to a realistic value in relation to the world’s leading currencies.  
      The rehabilitation phase (from 1987-1990 marked the beginning of SAP) sought to 
ensure substantial economic growth through sector rehabilitation; and to improve public 
sector management. Emphasis was on structural reforms to enhance conditions for 
growth and to improve economic efficiency. The programme aimed at reforming and 
rehabilitating the transport sector, power supply, communication and water supply. The 
state’s role in economic activity was to be reduced and state enterprises were to be 
rationalized by divesting and liquidating some 200 of them (Manuh 1994). 
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      The economic reforms achieved some successes. Gross National Product (GNP) since 
1983 grew by 5% per annum, with annual per capita income growing at 2.4% (Manuh 
1994). Agricultural output increased and grew at an annual rate of 5% since 1984. The 
mining sector registered significant improvements and recorded the highest growth by 
sector between 1983 and 1988 (Manuh 1994). On the fiscal front, budget deficits were 
reduced to a low level between 1982 and 1985, while surpluses occurred between 1986 
and 1991. Tax reforms led to increase revenue from other sectors of the economy while 
tax incentives were given to the cocoa sector to boost production. Government 
expenditures were contained in the initial stages, but could not be sustained due to 
election financing in the ensuing years. 
 
In spite of the successes chalked under the economic reforms, the impact of the reforms 
on the workers at the lower ranks of the public sector was massive (Ninsin 1991, Manuh 
1994). The economic reform package included the retrenchment of excess labour from 
the public service, and a freeze on new recruitment into the lower and middle grades in 
all areas of the public sector in order to cut the government’s wage bill. The civil service 
retrenched 10,500 workers in 1987, 11,000 in 1988, and 12,000 in 1989. During 1988-89, 
of the estimated 320,000 employees in the total 200 state-owned enterprises, at least 
39,800 were retrenched. The Cocoa Board retrenched 29,000 workers by 1988. Also an 
estimated number of 13,000 jobs were lost in manufacturing and electricity during 1982-
84 (figures were cited in Manuh 1994). In addition, according to Hutchful (2002) analysis 
regarding the ballooning of the lower grades of workers at the public sector between 1975 
and 1983, Ninsin (1991) equally observed a similar trend that occurred mainly at the 
junior staff level of the Ghana Education Service and the Civil Service. The retrenchment 
exercise accordingly targeted these junior staff including labourers, cleaners, drivers, 
stewards, cooks, porters, messengers, security personnel, clerical personnel, store officers 
and secretarial personnel. Following from the freeze on recruitment into the lower 
echelons of the public sector, it was projected that “no school leavers from primary and 
junior secondary schools can expect formal wage or salaried employment” (Manuh 
1994:67) 
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      The effect of ERP/SAP on rural employment is noted. Some categories of workers 
employed in plantations in some rural communities were retrenched. Manuh (1994) 
mentioned in particular the majority of casual workers employed for specific periods who 
in reality stayed on for longer periods and were converted into permanent staff after some 
time. Ghana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) reported a loss of 14,000 workers in 
the cocoa sub-sector under SAP, about 12,000 workers from the Food Production 
Corporation and 9,000 from the state Farms Corporation. Its membership fell from 
150,000 to about 110,000 by 1988 (Manuh 1994). 
      The ultimate effect of the massive retrenchment in the 80s is that it added to the 
existing reserve army of labour that was occasioned by actions and inactions in the course 
of the country’s political and economic history. The retrenchment exercise weakened 
membership of organized labour, which amounts to de-collectivation of labour. Ninsin 
(1991:108-109) in his political economy analysis of the informal sector indicated that: 
 
The availability of a vast reserve army of labour waiting in the wings to catch 
the next available job…[is] likely to give employers – acting on behalf of 
capital - the liberty to either decide to lower wages or use the slightest event on 
the industrial relations front as a pretext to retrench additional 
labour…Because of the scarcity of job in relation to demand, employers would 
tend to offer very low wages to the newly employed workers as well as deny 
them job and social security. That is, in a situation of job scarcity, the members 
of the reserve army are available to be treated as casual workers. In short, the 
existence of a vast reserve army of unemployed labour acts as a powerful 
bargaining tool by which [employers are] able to further cheapen the cost of 
labour power and generally degrade labour. 
 
As much as this may be a right prognosis of the labour situation vis-à-vis the various 
retrenchment exercises that were pursued over the course of the political and economic 
history of Ghana, it lacks empirical foundation. 
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Tema in Perspective 
In 1952, the government of Ghana muted the idea to construct a new port and harbour at 
Tema. The village of Tema was situated 17 miles to the east of Accra. The inhabitants of 
Tema village were mostly fishermen and farmers. The original plan was to resettle the 
indigenous people of the village of Tema in a new place called Tema Manhean by the end 
of 1953 to pave way for the construction of the port and the harbour. The protracted 
negotiations between the government and the indigenous people, and the people’s distaste 
for their chief’s complicity in the whole scheme, dragged the resettlement exercise. 
Instead, it took the government seven years to effect the actual evacuation of Old Tema in 
1959. Meanwhile between these periods, 1952-1959, the building of Tema Harbour and 
the New Tema Township was in progress. The significance of the construction of the 
Tema Harbour and the building of the New Township to this study lies in the instigation 
of the movement of immigrants to Tema which tended to swell the population 
      The population of Old Tema in 1937 was estimated at 1,000 (Amarteifio et al. 1966). 
When another survey was conducted in 1952 the population had shot up to 4,000. By the 
close of 1959, the population had reached 10,000. According to Amarteifio et al. (1966), 
out of this figure, 4,000 (of whom) were non-indigenes who had come to work for the 
contractors and to trade with the workers, who by this time provided large markets for 
goods and services. Between 1952 and 1959, the population of Old Tema increased by 
about 100%, the immigration of non-Tema indigenes accounted for 40% of the 1959 
population. The majority of the non-indigenous people lived at the Old Tema Zongo. 
    The Old Tema Zongo was inhibited predominantly by people from northern Ghana, 
and neighbouring countries, who came to the place in search of jobs. Zongos are common 
in many Ghanaian towns and cities and according to Amarteifio et al. (1966), Zongos 
before 1961 were led by a Zarikin Zongo, and Headmen. The headmen who came under 
the Zarikin Zongo wielded a lot of authority and the major different ethnic groups that 
lived at the Zongo had their own headman, with each tending to live close to their fellow 
tribesmen. The practice of organising the different ethnic groups around headmen 
seemingly crept into the mobilisation of unskilled labour in Tema, which will shortly be 
seen in the proceeding discussions. The population of these non-indigenous Tema people 
in 1957 was estimated at 2,385. The dominance of the male population (which was 
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almost 60% of the total), was used to justify the point that the inhabitants were recent 
migrants (Amarteifio et al. 1966). With the 1,784 Zongo people who were engaged in 
some sort of employment, the majority of them were labourers (639), petty traders (584), 
watchmen (233) and butchers (46).   
         The site these new migrants occupied was also demarcated for development. 
However, the initial plan to resettle the indigenous people at Tema Manhean did not 
capture these recent migrants so they had to be moved to Ashaimang, on the Accra-Ada 
road, 6 miles from Tema. This was what Amarteifio et al. (1966) reported: 
 
“Persons not entitled to a new house in Tema Manhean at the time of the move 
were allocated plots on which to build at Ashaimang, on Accra-Ada road…they 
were also given pieces of timber and corrugated iron sheets from Old Tema 
after houses were demolished. According to the 1948 census the population of 
Ashaimang was 185, the 1960 census recorded 2,624 people, most of them had 
been removed from the Old Tema Zongo.”  
 
Ashaimang, which is today at the periphery of the Tema Township, exhibits all the 
characteristics of a slum community: highly congested, lacking basic amenities, and 
displaying poor sanitary conditions. The place is populated by low income residents 
living in shabby houses. It has also come to serve as the bastion for the supply of cheap 
labour.   
 
The influx of immigrants to Tema, according to Amarteifio et al. (1966), was a direct 
consequence of the large scale development resulting in the building of Tema Harbour 
and Tema New Town. To further buttress this, the population distribution of the new 
migrants to Tema Manhean in 1961 (two years after the resettlement scheme had been 
completed) showed a preponderance of youthful male population. Apparently most of 
them had come to Tema to either work on the new port or on their own behalf as semi-
skilled and unskilled workers.   
                             
The population of Tema together with its suburbs grew to about 80,000 in 1968 largely 
due to the influx of skilled and unskilled workers with implications on the employment 
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front for both literate and illiterate workers. Peil’s (1969) study in Tema and its suburb, 
Ashaiman, revealed that as major building projects were completed, and with the 
stagnation of the country’s economy, the government and the private industries were not 
in the position to start new projects. In effect, there were limited job openings for 
electricians, steel benders, plumbers and carpenters (skills that are learn through the 
apprenticeship system). The exception, according to Peil, was unskilled labour that was 
highly utilised by the port. Her analysis indicated that unemployment was highest among 
middle school leavers. She recognized the educational inadequacy of the middle school 
leavers and how it limited their job search and opportunities: 
 
“Studies of middle school leavers in this area have shown that they are quite 
aware of the limitations of their education and look to semi-skilled work as the 
best prospect for those unable to get an apprenticeship. Tema is noted for 
having relatively high proportion of semi-skilled work and wage rates are 
higher than in Accra. More people mentioned unskilled work as an alternative 
rather than as the job they were looking for, and workers in all categories were 
doing unskilled work to support themselves. Those seeking only unskilled work 
were largely uneducated and many came form outside Ghana” (1969:413-414).   
 
“The typical man seeking a skilled job was the  [man] who had entered his 
apprenticeship soon after leaving middle school, migrated to Tema during the 
early growth years and had lost his two previous jobs through redundancy. 
Now in his late twenties, he was trying to support his family by doing odd jobs 
while waiting for building of the next section of Tema to begin” (1969:413). 
 
It is worth noting that unemployment was not the lot of the unskilled workers and those 
with least education only, but also the skilled (defined in terms of apprenticeship skills) 
worker in Tema. The unskilled or the semi-skilled Tema worker, by the very fact of their 
educational background, had limited opportunities in getting job in areas that required 
apprenticeship skills, and to the skilled workers the sporadic and irregular nature of the 
Tema building projects to which they mostly depended on, sometimes rendered them 
temporary unemployed.  
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 Peil’s analyses of Tema unemployment in the late sixties complement other discourses on 
the processes of informalisation that occurred at the national level during the 1960s. That 
is, the churning out of ill-equipped school leavers to compete for limited job 
opportunities in the labour market, and the failure of the modern economy to expand to 
absorb such large numbers, compelled most of them to seek informal employment (refer 
to page 27 for Hart and Ninsin analyses). 
 
The unskilled and the semi-skilled workers historically relied on multiple channels to 
look for jobs. Generally, it is noted that informal workers tend to rely mostly on informal 
social contacts, such as kinship networks, in search for job. The situation in Tema 
historically, seemed not to conform to this general idea. On the contrary, studies in the 
sixties points to the fact that kinship networks were least relied on by unskilled and semi-
skilled workers in their job searching efforts in Tema. The reason for such a paradox was 
attributed in part to the newness of the Tema Township and also to the fact that the 
recency of the migrant workers made it less likely for them to have a set of social 
networks on which they could rely on in the process of their job searches (Peil 1969).    
    This situation in Tema was equally understandable because at the time all medium and 
low level jobs were by statue required to be filled through the Tema Labour Office. 
According to Peil’s study, the majority of the migrants sought work through the Labour 
Office, which more or less served as a replacement for, or in some cases in combination 
with, sparse use of kinship relations.  
        The effectuality of the Labour Office was tested under growing unemployment. As 
the period of unemployment began to lengthen, as a result of the growing unemployment, 
the people began to loss faith in the ability of the Labour Office to help them. Peil’s 
(1969) study indicated that about one in eight of the men who visited the Labour Office 
said it was useless and that there were no jobs to be offered to them. There were also 
complaints of bribe taking against the Labour Officers. A number of the unemployed who 
frequented the Labour office indicated that bribes and connections were necessary for one 
to obtain job. Incidence of bribe taking should indeed be expected in situations of large 
numbers of unemployed as against very few job openings. 
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 Tema has grown to become a hub of economic activity in Ghana offering employment to 
many categories of people. The population of Tema in 1984 stood at 191,000 and it was 
projected to reach 359,000 in 2000 (Asafo-Boakye1993 in Darko 2001). Tema is now a 
major port and industrial city in Ghana. The harbour area is constituted of the main 
harbour and the fishing harbour.  
         The main harbour handles large proportions of the country’s imports - raw materials 
for the industries, vehicles, and general cargo - and export commodities such as cocoa. 
The fishing harbour, the biggest in the country, is the major terminal for a number of 
fishing vessels both local and international. At the main and the fishing harbours is found 
large a pool of casual workers who are hired either through an individual contractor or a 
firm-like agency to undertake loading and unloading tasks for stevedore companies. 
        Tema houses the country’s major industrial establishments that are into the 
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals, daily wares, textiles, iron and steel, aluminum 
smelting, etc. The onset of the economic crisis in the 1980s caused some of the industries 
to either fold up or reduce the scale of their activities.  
       The above historical account seems to emphasize the point that informality in Tema 
is steeped in historical processes and structures and that to understand the process of 
mobilising casual workers in Tema is also to analyse informal work historically in the 
area. 
 
Description of Labour Intermediary Agents in the Study Area 
The mobilisation and management of temporary workers or casual workers in an 
institutionalised form is relatively recent. However, those operating at the harbour exhibit 
structures that are situated in history. The exact number of intermediary labour agents 
operating in Ghana is unknown. Some of the labour intermediaries contacted have been 
in operation for the past decade.  
          Established in 1995, L’aine Services, a highly institutionalised recruitment agency, 
has some characteristics which are similar to employment agencies operating in the West. 
The agency is engaged in recruitment of temporary staff and what is considered as 
permanent outsourced staff. The temporary staff worker may be on the job for a duration 
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ranging between a day and a year, whilst the permanent outsourced staff work for the 
client permanently, but remain on the pay roll of the agency. The agency recruits 
different categories of workers. Among them are unskilled and semi-skilled factory hands, 
house helps, caretakers, cooks, secretaries, messengers, hotel attendants, drivers etc. It 
has the responsibility to manage the pay roll and attendance of its “outsourced” or hired 
workers in the factories. It has about 1,000 outsourced workers whom they recruited for 
and manage at the premises of the client companies. The agency has numerous lucrative 
clients including multinational companies, state institutions, hotels, banks and other 
private companies.  
      In sharp contrast to L’aine Services, The Househelp Agency is a sole proprietorship 
agency that specialises mostly in the supply of househelps. Though it began its operation 
by supplying mainly househelps, in recent times, because of the demand for drivers, 
gardeners and cook stewards it has expanded its operations to cover them. What the client 
has to do is to simply walk to the agency’s outfit and bargain for the price of the domestic 
worker she wants. The client fills a form detailing the type of domestic worker she wants. 
On this same form are indicated the terms of the contract.  The agency then matches this 
request form with a pilled of registration forms, which indicates the profile of the would-
be worker, and select the worker for the client. The initial financial obligation of the 
would-be domestic worker towards the agency is the registration payment of 10,000 cedis 
($1.00)4. Once a job is secured for the worker, one third of her first monthly salary is 
taken by the agency. The monthly salaries of the workers range from 150,000 to 300,000 
cedis ($16-66) per month. In the wake of escalating incidence of robbery, the clients 
place premium on honesty and trust. Accordingly, the applicants’ backgrounds are 
thoroughly checked and screened by the agency before they are considered for 
employment. The agency constantly conducts follow-ups to ensure that the terms of the 
employment engagement are not abused by the clients. In times of abuse, the agency 
withdraws the worker and places her in another job. Most of the domestic workers 
supplied by this agency are young girls, the majority of them are migrants from the 
village.    
    
                                                 
4 US$1.00 was equivalent to 9,000 Ghanaian cedis as at 2004. 
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The Ghana Dock Labour Company and National Fish Stevedores Association operate at 
the Tema Main Harbour and Fishing Harbour respectively. GDLC was formed in 2002 as 
a response to diffuse agitation by the casual dock workers on March 5, 2002. NFSA on 
the other hand was incorporated in 1999. These agencies were recently formed but their 
current structures are fashioned out based on the gang system that had long established 
itself at the port. I would want to first highlight the features of the gang system before 
turning our attention to the features and mode of operations of these agencies. 
      The gang system bears resemblance to Lourenco-Lindell’s (2002) description of day 
labour in Bissau, where day workers are organised into groups with headman who 
intermediates between the employers and the day workers. The employment relations 
between the casual workers and the employers are highly informal entailing neither social 
security, nor compensations for injuries picked up at the worksite. In Tema today, the 
independent operation of the gang system at the Main and the Fishing Harbour, except in 
warehouses, is no longer in vogue. Instead they have been adopted by the agencies, 
which have brought about redefinition of the dynamics of the gang system. 
      Prior to the establishment of, for instance GDLC, the gang system operated partially 
independent of the Labour Office (see page 45), a recruitment outfit that recruited 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour for Ghana Port and Harbours Authority and other 
companies. Even though the Labour Office was officially obliged to recruit casual 
dockworkers, the role of the headmen was pivotal in the recruitment process.  
 
The Gang System 
The gang system is a group of casual workers and a headman. The headman is the leader 
of the group. The gang consists of either 8 (shore) or 13 (on-board) regular members 
excluding the headman. The regular casuals are always assured of work whenever their 
gang is booked for work. At the margin of the gang system is what is called the 
replacement casual workers. They represent a kind of buffer casual workers and also 
constitute an entry point to the gang system. In the event that a regular member of the 
gang is absent, a replacement worker is then called to fill the vacancy until the member 
returns. One could also graduate from replacement casual worker to a regular member in 
situations of permanent vacancy in the gang. The structure of the gang system is 
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hierarchically arranged such that the headman is at the top, followed by the regular 
members and at the bottom are the replacement workers, whose job allocation are highly 
irregular and unpredictable compared to regular gang members. It is important to note 
that the insertion of agencies into the arrangement of casual workers has had differing 
impacts on these different categories of workers (see pp 64-68). 
      Previously the headmen were considered as tin gods, who could hire and fire the 
members of the gangs at will and merely inform the Labour Office about their actions. 
Entry into the casual work at the port in general, and into a gang was highly restricted to 
reduce competition among the casual workers for job allocation, a situation which has 
changed under the current arrangements with the hire agency as would be shown in the 
next chapter. Personal contacts were very important to enable one to secure a place in a 
gang. Would-be workers were in most instances introduced to the headmen by other 
dockworkers, officials at the Labour Office, friends and relatives. Once they were 
introduced to the headman, he then placed them on replacement and monitors their 
performance for their eligibility into the gang system. The progression of the new 
entrants into regular membership was contingent upon ones conformity with the gang 
culture: hard work, honesty, discipline, and most importantly respect for the headman. 
The gang culture was/is also linked to issues of welfare, sometimes in the forms of 
financial support to fellow gang members who were/are in need. Such new entrants could 
work as replacement casual workers for about 3 years before they would be absorbed into 
the gang, when there was a permanent vacancy.  
       It was gathered on the field that there were about 20 different gang groups that 
operated at the Main Harbour until 2002.  Their main offices were under tree sheds with 
no records on their activities. The headmen had sole knowledge of any work agreements 
that existed between the workers and the employers, and was responsible for effecting the 
payments of wages, which were done immediately after the day’s work. Contrary to the 
belief that day workers generally lack remunerative benefits, the day workers in Tema 
were entitled to annual bonuses and leave allowances (a practice which is still in vogue).  
       There were complaints to the effect that the headmen could use their position to 
manipulate wage and payments of bonuses and allowances meant for their gangmen. 
There were reported cases of the practice whereby the headmen could reduce the size of 
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the gang to perform the usual quantum of the job meant for the required size of the gang. 
Savings made for reducing the size of the gang went to the headmen. Regular members 
who dared to challenge their misdeeds were threatened with loss of membership in the 
gang. The headmen, even though were also casual workers, by the very fact of their 
leadership position, wielded a lot of control over their members. They were in fact 
individual agents whose role helped to link casual workers to employers at the port. 
 
Ghana Dock Labour Company is a privately owned labour recruitment agency. The 
owners of this company are eight stevedore companies, including Ghana Ports and 
Harbour Authority, and the Maritime and Dockworker Union (MDU), a majority 
shareholder with 20% shares. The remaining 80% shares go the eight stevedore 
companies. GDLC was established to recruit, administer and manage casual labour for 
the stevedore companies. In other words, the employers or the clients established the 
company to supply labour to themselves. GDLC derived most of its current crop of 
casual workers from the retrenched casual workers who worked under Ghana Ports and 
Harbours Authority (GPHA) through the Labour Office. On 28th May, 2002, the former 
casual workers of GPHA embarked on a demonstration to press the authority to effect the 
right payment of their severance benefits. In the midst of the demonstrations, GDLC 
which had newly been established carried announcements on air for individuals interested 
in working at the port to register with it. It then began to register new hands to replace the 
striking casual workers. This move was indeed meant to break the front of the striking 
casual workers, who in the end had to register with GDLC (see The Ghanaian Chronicle 
report carried by ghanaweb, 30th May 2002 in appendix 2).  
      An official at GDLC described the company as an attempt by its owners to formalise 
the organisation and management of casual work at the harbour, which represents a 
departure from the informal way of organising the casual workers. Similarly, the 
Secretary General of Ghana TUC was reported in the media to have lauded the ingenuity 
that went into the creation of this labour hire agency and its contribution to employment 
generation in Ghana5. GDLC specialises in the supply of dock casual workers and like 
                                                 
5 The report in question was on the website of Spacefm, a Sunyani based Local FM station(date not 
available) 
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L’aine Services, it represents another institutionalised form of mobilising and organising 
temporary workers. It has modern administrative setup, made up of operations, accounts, 
allocation, personnel and safety offices. In place of tree sheds, the agency has constructed 
a big shed under which the workers sit and wait for their work allocations. A television 
set is provided for the waiting workers under the shed to help them kill boredom. When 
job becomes available one could hear loud noises from speakers, calling the gangs 
booked for the day’s work. The booked gangs are then provided with vehicles to ensure 
their quick dispatch from the agency’s premises to the worksite. The company has 
created 45 gangs which work on board the ships and 59 shore gangs. The workers are 
categorised into ordinary dockworkers, winch men, tally clerks, and heavy duty operators.  
      The agency has adopted and adapted the structure of the gang system into its 
operations. The headman provides leadership to the gangs, but does not play an 
intermediary role between the workers and employers. By virtue of their experience, they 
have been maintained to supervise the gangmen and to train new entrants who are 
frequently filled into the gang. There are also about 150 casual workers who are on the 
agency’s replacement list. The agency could supply 4000 casual workers on demand but 
has about 2500 active workers in its book. The local union of the casual workers 
negotiates with the agency for better working conditions for the workers. An affiliate of 
MDU carries the name GDLC non-permanent workers of MDU. Some of the executives 
of the union are also casual workers; in fact they are headmen and the likelihood for them 
to be enticed with special work allocations is very high. This represents crafty cooption 
of the labour union into the operations of the agency. Most of the workers interviewed 
had little faith in the ability of their union to bring about any positive changes in their 
working conditions.The union do have teeth but cannot bite. Why can a local union, 
which is affiliated to a major shareholder of the agency - MDU - claim to fight for an 
improvement in working conditions for the workers? The Local Union can at best be 
described as a welfare union. On the front of negotiating for better wages and improved 
working conditions the union has not achieve much. It is being seen as an avenue by the 
workers to seek financial support in the face of dwindling incomes.     
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National Fish Stevedores Association (NFSA), which operates at the fishing harbour, is 
an amalgamation of 17 individual contractors. NFSA is not a labour agency per se, but as 
one executive member indicated, “it is an association that was established on the 
instigation of government to regulate the activities of the contractors that handle frozen 
cargo at this port”. The minimum labour requirements the association uses for its 
operations in a day is about 600. Each contractor maintains some kind of gang but not 
very structured. The size of the gang is not fixed as in the case of GDLC. It is highly 
variable and depends on the volume of cargo that the contractor has got to discharge. On 
a particular day a gang of 10 men is used, on another day a gang of 7 men would be used 
depending on the volume of work and how fast or slow the owner of the fish wants his 
cargo to be discharged. Due to the unpredictability of the arrivals of vessels, the gangs 
maintain some sort of core or permanent members, whose services can be relied on at any 
moment. Some of the gang members have been in this business for about 15 years, and it 
is such hands that constitute the core members of the gang. About 40% of the total 
workforce that is dispatched to work at a time constitutes the old hands. The association 
does not have a systematic method for recruiting the casual workers. When an official of 
the association was asked about the method they use to recruit people, his response was 
that: “if you are short of money, you will come here”. Meaning that the casual workers, 
particularly those considered as outliers, willingly walk to the premises of the association 
to look for job. In times of high volume of work, the headmen simply walk around and 
mobilise some of the mango mango boys (young men who hang around under trees) to 
join their gangs. 
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                                        Chapter Five 
 
Employment relations of the Labour Intermediary Workers 
 
This chapter is devoted to the characteristics of the workers and the nature of 
employment relations between them, and the agency and the employers on the other hand. 
The employment relation is disaggregated to cover issues such as the nature of contract, 
regularity of job and number of hours, wages and income, benefits enjoyed by the 
workers, training and skill acquisition, career progression, and issues related to health and 
risks (Lawson 1992).  The downgrading or upgrading of the conditions of workers is 
directly influenced by the very nature of these issues. What then is the effect of the 
insertion of agencies in the recruitment process on the employment relations of the casual 
worker?  
 
The Background of the Casual/Temporary Workers  
The demographic characteristics of casual workers included in the interviews showed a 
preponderance of a youthful population between the ages of 20 and 35. The majority of 
them had secondary, middle and vocational education. The reasons for not being able to 
continue the education was either because the father died in the course of schooling or the 
family could not raise the needed funds to pay the school fees. There were few instances 
where individuals with higher educational qualification entered the casual labour market. 
Such individuals started as casual tally clerks, in the case of the port, as a way of gaining 
entry into lucrative sections of the Maritime business. In addition to either middle or 
secondary education, greater number of the interviewees had apprenticeship skills such as 
carpentry, mechanics, tailoring, auto electrician etc. They have taken up their current job 
with the expectation that they could raise enough capital to start their own small 
businesses, but most of them seem to have been trapped in the casual labour market with 
the least promise that they could raise such capital against the backdrop of dwindling 
income and harsh economic conditions. For some of the workers at the port, the only 
work they have known is casual work, with some of them having worked as casual 
workers for close to 15 years. To most of the casual workers at GDLC, their career path 
can be described as from permanent casuals to agency casuals. 
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Due to the strenuous nature of the work and the physical strength that is required to 
undertake the loading and unloading tasks, casual work at the port is male dominated. On 
the other hand, The Househelp Agency, which supplies mainly domestic workers, is 
dominated by female workers. L’aine Services supplies mixes of male and female 
outsourced temporary workers, however, the factory hands are predominantly male 
workers, whilst its domestic workers are mainly females.  
     The origin of the casual workers employed through the agencies at the port is diverse. 
Most of them are from northern Ghana. There are also immigrant casual workers from 
neighbouring countries such as Mali, Niger and Nigeria. According to the secretary of 
GDLC non-permanent workers union of MDU, about 35% of the workers are immigrants, 
with the majority of them coming from Niger and Mali. The workers travel wide and afar 
from places such as Kasoa, Accra New Town, Ashiaman and Nima (some of these places 
are slum areas) to converge at the premises of the agencies almost everyday to count their 
stars for job allocation.  
 
The Nature of the Job 
Generally, the casual workers perform manual jobs, mainly loading, unloading ship cargo, 
forklift drivers, sorting and packing of bottle into crates, packing of pallets, cleaning etc. 
The discharge of cargo at the port is highly strenuous, which tell a lot on the health of the 
workers. A gang of 13 men discharges 5,000 bags of rice or sugar (if a bag of rice weighs 
50 kgs) per shift (12 hours). This translates into 384.6 bags or 1,9230 kgs per head6. On 
the other hand, if the bag of either rice or sugar is 25 kgs, it then means that they have to 
discharge 10,000 bags per shift. For fertilizers, it is 4,000 bags for 50 kg or 8,000 bags for 
25kgs.  This is how an interviewee captured the drudgery nature of the job: 
 
Truly speaking, the work here is very difficult. If you go to work first and 
second times continuously, the third day, if you are not very strong you may not 
come back again. So here, we always keep on changing the gang members. 
Sometimes we fill 8-9 members exactly for the gangs. If you work with them for 
some time, you will not see some of the members again. If you go to their 
                                                 
6 The headman is excluded in this calculation, since in most cases he is not directly involved in the actual 
discharge of the cargo. 
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houses to look for them, you will not find them. The work we do here is very 
wearisome. It is not school book. It is physical. Majority of the workers here 
have hernia problems because of the lifting. We don’t have any education in 
the system. They don’t teach us anything at work. They don’t organise any 
educational programmes on even how to lift heavy things. The boys lift things 
anyhow. 
 
Training and Skills 
With the exception of L’aine Services, which has special training packages for its 
domestic assistants, the rest of the agencies adopt on-the-job training for the casual 
workers. As indicated in chapter three, under the headmanship system, the 3 year period 
that the new entrants needed in order to progress to regular casual workers was also 
regarded as a period of training during which they learned the job under the tutelage of 
the headman. There are certain categories of the casual workers such as plant operators 
and tally clerks whose job functions require some experience or a good educational 
background. In these areas, the agencies prefer to deal with individuals with some 
experience. But for those who are physically engaged in the loading and unloading of 
goods, the only requirement needed of them is their physical strength. This is how an 
agent at the fishing harbour reacted to the training of the casual workers: 
 
 For the new hands, they don’t know the difference between tuna fish and 
“shikaskika”. If for instance I need a worker just for loading, if you come here I 
will employ you but you will not sort the fish. The old hands I must say learn their 
skill on-the-job. It is only now that we are organising some sort of training for 
them. But no matter the type of training we organise, it is going to be on-the-job. 
When it comes to sorting of fish, there are about 10 different kinds of fish. We don’t 
have the drawings of the fish to tell that this is tuna or shikashika. The skilled 
worker (who apparently is a regular or as they call it permanent casual) just handles 
and looks at it to determine the type and the weight of the fish and put it in the right 
container. You see, you can’t train that theoretically. It is always on the job-
practical training.        
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   With regards to GDLC, the training strategy is that of pairing experienced casual 
workers, most of whom were retrenched casuals from GPHA, with the inexperienced or 
the new entrants. The new entrants are frequently filled into the gangs by the agency, and 
no longer have to follow the labour gang for the usual three years before they are 
accepted into the gangs. In this situation, the headman who in this case has no control 
over who should be in the gang, but by virtue of his experience is appointed the leader of 
the gang, may have to decide on the right pairing at the worksite. Sometimes the 
headmen have to work alongside with the gang members and demonstrate to the new 
entrants the antics of the job - in this way the new entrants get to learn the job. On-the-job 
training has an obvious cost advantage to the employers. It absorbs the employers from 
expenses that could have been incurred in organising training programmes for the 
workers.   
 
 
Contract of Employment between the Workers and Employers 
 
“…the employment contact [contract] between employers and employees is replaced by a 
commercial contract between the labour hire company and its client company” 
(Endresen 2000:8). 
 
The client companies do not enter into any employment agreement with the casual 
workers, but rather the labour hire agencies. In situations where there exist employment 
agreements, they are between the employees and labour hire agencies.  The contracts 
exist in either written or in oral forms. To the clients, the hire agencies are obliged to 
supply their products, in this case labour power, to them on demand. The agencies’ 
workers were persistently asked by the client companies; aren’t you casual workers form 
Dock Labour or contract workers from L’aine Services? Thus making a distinction 
between their employees and hired or contract casual workers from the agencies. An 
official at GDLC indicated that the agency enters into contractual agreements with both 
the clients and the workers. With regards to the workers, as part of the terms of the 
contracts, the agency is entitled to provide protective apparels, leave allowance, annual 
bonus, provident fund, overtime payments, social security, and transport for the workers 
to the work station. However, when the workers were asked whether there exist any 
contract between them and the hire agency, the response was in the negative:  
 56
  As casual workers, we don’t have any contract to sign. The name casual itself 
signifies that, if you like, you come to work and if you don’t like you don’t come to 
work. If you come to work today and find out that the job is too difficult you can 
decide not to come here again. As soon as you are registered you can get a gang. 
But Down There, the contract that we had, with the headmen, was to conform to 
the gang culture, which regulated the way we performed our job. Even though we 
are currently registered under dock labour, the headmen together with the local 
union leaders in a sense serve as channel through whom we get to know the terms 
of our work here. They are the ones who communicate to us what our obligations 
are at the worksite and all issues related to our work entitlements. 
 
In the absence of written employment contract, the contract between the casual workers 
and the agency is constructed orally or informally through the headmen and the local 
union.  Even though the workers do not have any written contract showing the terms of 
their employment engagements, they showed a good knowledge of what their obligations 
are, and what they are entitled to receive from the agency. The role of the local union of 
the casual workers has been instrumental in creating the awareness among the casual 
workers about their work entitlements; 
 
The union put on the notice board the figures for overtime rate, transport 
allowances and the basic rates for everybody to see so that nobody can cheat the 
workers. Those days when the casuals were operating under tree sheds, it was not 
so. There were some of the workers that if you asked them what their basic rate 
was, they didn’t know. What they could tell you was that “the headman gave me 49, 
000 cedis”. Those days at the end of the year, the client companies would bring 
something like 10 million cedis to the headman to distribute to the gang members 
as their annual bonuses and leave allowances. Because there were no records 
covering the number of hours the workers might have worked in the course of the 
year, the headmen took advantage of the situation and made under payments to the 
casual workers. But here the awareness is very high and that is keeping some of the 
headmen financially down (the secretary of the local union).  
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In the case of L’aine Services, their temporary workers do have formal written contracts, 
but the terms of the contract of employment do not formalise the employment contract 
between the workers and the employers. Refer to appendix 3 for the content of the terms 
and conditions of employment of a contract worker who had 3 months continuous 
employment as factory hand through L’aine Services. 
      This worker in question was reappointed for another three months on January 10th, 
2003, and had his appointment terminated on the 12th of April, 2003. The reason for his 
dismissal was that he happened to doss during night shift. The next day when he went to 
report to the agency, the factory manager had already lodged a complaint. His dismissal 
letter was immediately given to him. Probably sleeping at work was the last straw that 
was used to break the camel’s back. Prior to this incidence, some casual workers of this 
company in question, about 30 of them, agitated for the restoration of some deductions 
that had been made to their salaries. This might have been the real cause of the dismissal 
of this worker and 30 others. 
 
Unlike other casual workers, who may not know when the next job would be available; 
this worker was at least assured of a kind of continuous employment for three months,  
yet his job was highly contingent. The above example illustrates the point that seeking 
employment through an institutionalised agency may not safeguard employment security 
of the casual worker through the mere provision of written documents if the terms and the 
conditions spelt out in the contract are poor. In this case the terms of the employment 
makes the worker more vulnerable to the exploits of the client company.  
 
Wages and Benefits of the Workers 
The wages of the workers in this study are not uniform. They are based on hourly rates, 
eight-hour basic rate and per day rate. The factory hand workers from L’aine Services are 
paid based on an hourly rate, whilst casual workers from GDLC and the fishing harbour 
are paid using 8 hr basic and per day rates respectively. Whilst some of the factory hands 
employed through L’aine Services were receiving somewhere around 500,000 cedis ($56) 
as their monthly salary, the ordinary casual workers at the fishing harbour were getting 
20,000 cedis ($2.2) per day, payable to them every two days after the day’s work – it is 
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important to note that this figure is determined regardless of the number of hours worked 
during the day’s work. At GDLC, the workers are paid three days after one finishes his 
work schedule. To some of the casual workers, their daily survival depends so much on 
the casual job that allowing three days to elapse before their wages are paid puts their 
daily livelihoods on the edge: 
 
When we were Down There, we were paid daily but here it takes three days before 
payments are done. Some of them travel long distances to this place, they have 
wives and kids to look after, and they have no money at home, so they come here 
with the hope that at the end of the day’s job they will get money back home. They 
finish the job and the money is not paid to them immediately - it has to take three 
days. What is he going to use to pay for transport back home? It is a problem 
because you may for instance, work on Monday and take the money on Thursday. 
Between Monday and Thursday you have to borrow against your money. So by the 
time you are paid, what will be left in your pocket would be about 10,000 cedis ($ 
1.1) or 20,000 - $2.2 (an interview with a headman). 
 
      The wage for the casual workers at GDLC varies according to the category in which 
the worker belongs to. Category one is made up of the ordinary dockworkers, such as the 
regular gang members and the replacement casual workers. Category two is constituted 
of plant operators and winch men and category three; headmen and tally clerks. Their 
supposed wages for weekdays were as follow; 
 
Category 1 
Basic wage per 8 hours = 21,894 cedis 
Overtime rate per hour = 4,106 cedis (multiplied by 4)7
Transport allowance =     9,150 cedis (fixed for all the categories) 
Gross wage = 47,468  
Deductions (apply to all the various groups); 
Welfare fund to the local union =1,000 cedis 
Dues to the mother union (Maritime and Dockworkers Union) = 500 cedis 
                                                 
7 On average most of the workers are required to finish their shifts in 12hours, meaning 4hrs overtime  
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Social security contribution = 973 cedis 
If the casual worker in this category works in a day shift he is suppose to take home about 
44,935 cedis ($5.00). This figure is very close to the 40,000 cedis ($4.4) the workers 
persistently quoted as their actual wage for the 12 hour day shift. During night shifts, they 
enjoy night allowance of 11,055 cedis ($1.2). During night shifts they are suppose to earn 
55,990 ($6.2) as against the 50,000 cedis ($ 5.8) the workers quoted as their wage for 
night shifts for normal week days. During weekends, this group of casual workers earns 
5,274 cedis as overtime rate per hour and 27,625 cedis as weekend night allowance. 
 
Category 3 
Day shift (weekdays) 
Basic rate for 8hours = 26,370 cedis 
Overtime rate per hour = 4,944 cedis (multiplied by 4) 
Transport allowance = 9,150 cedis 
Total deductions = 2,473 cedis 
Suppose take home wage = 52,823 cedis ($5.8). The headmen who are in this group also 
quoted 47,000 ($5.2) as their actual take home wage for day shift. Is it a sheer 
coincidence that the difference between what they are supposed to earn as the wage for 
day shift and what the workers actually quoted for both group 1 and 2 is $0.6? 
 
Night shift (weekdays) 
Take home pay for day shift = 52,823 cedis 
Night allowance = 13,310 cedis 
Total = 66133 ($7.4). In this instance too, the headmen quoted 59,000 ($6.6) as what they 
actually earn as their take home wage. The overtime rate and weekend night allowance 
for group 3 are 6,593 and 33,281 respectively (see appendix 4 for detailed figures on 
wages and allowances for the other groups). In addition to social security and night 
allowances, the casual workers are entitled to provident fund and medical allowances. 
The agency finances the allowances and other benefits through the premium they charge 
the client companies.  
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   Related to the wages of the casual workers at GDLC is what can be termed as target 
wage. This is an income incentive that is given to the casual workers if they are able to 
meet their work schedule before the allotted time of 12 hours per shift. Looking at the 
margin that the workers receive vis-à-vis the wage for the normal 12 hour shift (2000 
cedis or $0.2 difference), it is the merchants and the shipping companies that stand to 
benefit most. Unlike the dock labour, the gang members who are organised under NFSA 
do not work on target. Sometimes if a job which is supposed to be completed in three 
days is done in two days, the workers are paid a day’s wage in addition. The case below 
is how a respondent explain the logic underlying the target system: 
 
Originally it was difficult for the shipping merchants to determine locally when 
they could finish unloading their vessels which was always a border to them. The 
longer the vessel stays at berth the higher the charges and any profit-oriented 
enterprise would want to avoid any delays at the port. You know our people when 
there are no such incentives (target incentive); they adopt what they call delay 
tactics. So from 7:30am, when the morning shift starts to 7:00pm, you would be 
surprise that within that period they could discharge 500 bags or 1,000 bags. With 
such delays in discharging cargo, they were paying more in terms of port and 
handling charges. So they sat down and came up with this idea to avoid such 
delays. The target strategy is helping them because they know that a gang per shift 
is 5,000 bags (250 tonnes), and when everything goes on well they can run about 
three shifts within 24 hours. This saves them from delays and cost. They sometimes 
reward the hardworking gangs with extra monies, apart from what dock labour 
gives them. 
 
The wages above obviously were higher than the official national minimum wage8. This 
was used by some of the agency officials to make the case that the wage they offer to the 
casual workers was higher than the minimum national wage used in the formal sector. On 
face value, the casual workers earn a wage higher than the minimum wage; however, 
there is a critical issue to the nature of casual work that renders this position defective, 
and that is the frequency or the regularity at which the casual workers get job allocations. 
                                                 
8 Minimum wage as at 2004 was 11,000 cedis or approximately $1.2 
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The regularity or otherwise of getting job allocation influences the income of the worker. 
Under the current circumstances it is very rare for the casual workers to secure regular 
casual jobs. This would be discussed in the next section. It is also important to find out if 
the current earnings of the casual workers are comparable to what they might have earned 
if they were employed directly by the employers, or to their previous earnings. 
Particularly for those workers who have been in the casual labour market for a long time 
it was easy for them to compare the size of their incomes as agency casuals with their 
previous incomes. Generally the impression gathered in the field suggests reduction in 
the size and increasing irregularity of their incomes. 
     According to some of the workers they would have, for instance, earned better income 
than what they earned currently if they were employed directly by the shipping merchants 
or if the agency were to supply labour directly to the shipping merchants, or as is the case 
of other gangs which work independently in other warehouses. This is what an 
interviewee, who happened to be an executive member of the local union of the casual 
workers at GDLC, had to say in connection to this: 
 
The agency is also dancing to the tune of the masters. And what is the tune of the 
masters? Let the guys work more; pay them less so that we make more money. 
Exploitation has been my watch word anytime we go for negotiations. When you 
take the figures i.e. the international rates that the stevedore companies are 
charging they should have paid the casual workers more. Take for instance the 
overtime rates per hour for regular casuals and tally clerks, they charge the 
merchant ships $2.6 (23,400 cedis) and $4.4 (36,000 cedis) per head respectively. 
Out of these figures they pay these two categories of workers $0.5 (4,106 cedis) 
and $0.6 (4,944 cedis) as overtime rates per hour respectively. When it comes to 
the basic rate per 8hours, they charge the shipping merchants $ 16.32 (146,880 
cedis) per head. If you look at what they are paying to our workers it is pure 
exploitation. So we have started suggesting that dock labour should be made to 
provide labour directly to the shipping merchants and let’s see what happens. The 
workers are highly dissatisfied because if you compare the nature of the job they 
do here to the earnings that accrue to them, it is an insult. 
     Another dimension to this is also that when you compare what our boys earn 
compared to those gangs that work outside in warehouses is not enough. In our 
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case, eight people have to load 5,000 bags, and if you consider the money paid to 
these eight people, it is less than those who work outside in warehouses. The boys 
know about this and they sometimes make references to a situation where 14-15 
people who work in warehouse load 1,000 bags and receive 60,000 cedis per head 
as compare to their case where 8 people load 5,000 bags and earns about 42,000 
cedis per head. The number of people in the gang that handles the tonnage (250 
tonnes) is too small - they have to increase it. 
 
With all the agencies interviewed, only GDLC pays the casual workers annual bonuses 
and leave allowances. As much as this is a unique dimension to casual work, the workers 
covered in the interview frequently complained about the shrinking size of their leave 
allowances and annual bonuses compared to their previous allowances. This is the 
description some of the headmen gave to the situation: 
   
The back pay we used to receive down there was far more than the bonus, back pay 
and leave allowance altogether, that was given to me last year. Some of the 
workers, the whole year, including a brother of mine took 6,000 cedis as their 
annual bonus. To date some of the workers have not received their annual bonuses 
and leave allowances for last year. I, for instance, the annual bonus I got fell short 
of the number of days I had worked. I have records and the records of my gang 
members of the number days we worked. 
      To another headman, this is what he had to say in connection to 
allowances and bonuses: 
Last year I received 395,000 cedis ($ 43.9) as my annual bonuses and leave 
allowances, which was far less than what I used to receive before coming to work 
under this agency. When you complain that what they have paid you doesn’t 
commensurate to the number of days you have worked, they tell you it was a 
computer mistake and that supplementary payment would follow. If you dare raise 
your voice again about the non-payment of the money, they begin to threaten you 
with suspension. They tell you that their doors are opened and that if you feel you 
can’t work with them you can walk out.  
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Administrative lapses intentionally or otherwise may account for this state of the 
workers’ allowances. Another dimension to this state of affairs is the fact that casual 
workers earn income only when there is job to be done and so any changes in the 
frequency of getting job allocation definitely affects all aspects of their incomes, 
including allowances and wages.  
     The benefits enjoyed by the casual workers covered in the interview are not even. 
Whilst GDLC offers transport, leave and annual bonuses to its hired workers, the other 
labour intermediary agencies do not. For NFSA, the only benefit offered to the casual 
workers was a free meal and this is what a contract worker from L’aine Services, who 
worked with a multinational company, had to say:  
 
We were not given canteen fees and the management (the client company) did not 
allow us to use the staff bus. According to them we were contract workers from 
L’aine Services and that it was the agency that was suppose to cater for our 
transportation needs and that if there was anything we seemed not to understand 
we had to sought it out with the agency because they  paid the agency to provide us 
with transportation. Again we were not issued I.D. cards and it was embarrassing 
to attempt to enter the factory premises without one.  
 
Regularity and Sources of Casual Work 
 
The regularity or the frequency at which an individual is booked or contracted by the hire 
agency to undertake a task hinges on the availability of job contracted to the agency. The 
frequency and the availability of sources of casual work, through or without the hire 
agents, to the individual in turn influence his income. Two issues, which are peculiar to 
casual workers hired through GDLC, and have impacted on the regularity at which the 
workers get job allocation were the size of, and the ease of entry into, the informal labour 
market. Lourenco-Lindell (2002) has observed in Bissau, Guinea, that the conditions of 
day workers were going under changes mainly due to the increasing number of people 
entering into casual work, which has brought in its wake increased competition among 
them for casual jobs. According to her, not only does the increasing size of the casual 
workers impact on the irregularity and size of their income but also their informal work 
relations are intensively exploited by capital with sanctions from the state. 
 64
      It is important to recall that the gang system, as it operated, had a way of restricting 
entry into the informal labour market at the Tema port. The requirement for one to be 
accepted into the gang system was based on the individual’s eagerness to adhere to the 
tenants of the gang culture. The new casual worker who was brought on board was placed 
on replacement and had to follow the gang for about three years to prove his worth; 
which was judged by his commitment to the cultural codes of the gang. This was a 
screening process that sought to restrict entry into the gangs and the general informal 
labour market. The role of the headmen was very prominent in the whole screening 
process. Under GDLC, the situation has changed. The agency’s gate is wide opened such 
that it has increased the ease of entry leading to the creation of a large reserve of casual 
workers. This has manifested itself in the creation of about 104 gang groups as against 20 
that existed before the establishment of the agency. Most of the agency casual workers 
interviewed repeatedly complained about the increasing irregularity of getting job 
allocation these days, which is consequently affecting their income sizes. Also their 
chances of getting casual jobs from different sources, which used to be the case, are also 
on the decline. Additionally, the casual workers indicated the effects of seasonality and 
the drudgery nature of the casual job on the irregularity of the job. The cases below were 
sentiments expressed by some of the casual workers in connection with irregularity of 
getting casual jobs under their current arrangements with the agency. 
 
Case one 
Those days it was the job that chased us instead of us having to chase for jobs. 
Sometimes after close of work a message would be sent around requesting for some 
of us to replace some absentee permanent workers. If in your own estimation you 
realise that by taking up the offer would not put a lot of strain on you physically to 
the extent of affecting your gang work the next day, you go for it. But now to be 
frank, the whole of last week our gang didn’t take any call sheet. This week we had 
only one call sheet. As I’m sitting here now, our gang has no allocation. You can 
come here and sit for the whole day without allocation, that is why when you came 
in we were playing cards. Previously we were about 20 gangs. Because of these 
“foreigners” (referring to streams of new entrants), they have formed the gangs to 
reach about 45 gangs. The highest job allocation that one can get per week is 
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about two. Formally if you wanted to work everyday in the week, you could get. But 
now they have opened their gate such that anyone who walks in looking for job is 
registered immediately and filled in a gang. In fact when I saw you come, I thought 
Ken was coming to register you as a tally clerk. Previously, as a headman, if I 
know that you’re disrespectful, I would not take you to work. But here, if you call 
other headmen, they will tell you the same thing; the gang is formed before they tell 
you the headman to be the head. Because of that the boys don’t respect our 
instructions. The practice that existed was that before you would be considered for 
a place in a gang you had to follow the gang for good three years. For instance, I 
had to follow my gang for good three years, my headman then (Amakye) is here he 
would testify to it, before I was considered a regular place in the gang. For the 
three years I was a replacement casual yet I was happy because it was easy to get 
work.  
    The reason is that we are too many here. I think every company has a limit on 
the number of people it employs at a time. That is why sometimes when you visit 
their notice boards it would be written “no vacancy”. Here, when somebody comes 
today, they will give him a place. If another comes tomorrow they will register him 
because of that the number keeps on increasing and as a result it may take you 
about 3-4 days to get allocation.  
   Those days we were not taking monthly salaries but at the end of the month, if 
nothing at all my income altogether could be equated to someone who earns 
monthly salaries because I had several jobs. At CTS, as a headman 1 was receiving 
about 60,000 cedis and the boys 40,000 cedis per day at the time. 
 
Case Two 
This is what an executive member of the local casual workers union had to 
say: Those days our people were better off, because one person could run through 
three different companies within the day. At the end of each job he was paid by the 
different companies and when he bundled them together, his pocket was very good. 
But now we are all under one umbrella, all the client companies have to come here 
to recruit the workers. It is something like job rationalisation which is not helping 
our people. When we were under the trees the companies were having their special 
gangs and human relations was very good because they knew that if they fail to 
treat the workers well, they would not get them to work with. I remember in those 
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days there was a company that was even paying during the night. Here they have to 
wait for three days until when the money is paid to them. When it comes to payment 
of annual bonuses and allowances, it is always a problem. It gives wrong signals 
that the people have fishy motives behind whatever is being done here. The client 
companies are the greatest beneficiaries because they have put up this agency and 
appointed people to manage it for them. Whose interest do you think the agency 
would serve? 
 
Case Three 
Getting job allocation is not fixed. It depends on the situation. There are seasons 
where there are jobs and seasons where there are no jobs. Sometimes for three 
continuous months, you may be lucky to get allocation for a day or two. The whole 
of February, for instance, I worked only twice. The two were not even continuous; I 
was allocated work the first and the last week in February. But for other gangs, 
such as those who work at the container depot (where they discharge transit goods) 
and in other warehouse, get job often to do.  When there are enough jobs, we work 
so hard for instance to pick four call sheets per day.  Picking four call sheets is 
excessive work. It becomes extremely difficult to work the next day even though 
there are jobs to be done. So they will be looking for workers and would not get 
them. Some of them would feel so tired that they would prefer to stay at home for 
one or two weeks. Jobs may be available but you can’t come and work because of 
the tiring nature of the job. They would come back only when the money they had 
accrued from their previous allocation is finished. 
    
     There may be enough jobs to do, at least at the individual level, but the tiring nature of 
the job may affect the frequency at which the worker may avail him to the job. 
   
The irregularity of the casual work has impacted differently on the casual workers. The 
replacement casuals seem to have been hit greatly by the infrequency of getting casual 
jobs. A regular casual who was once a replacement worker had this to say: For the three 
years, I was a replacement casual yet I enjoyed because it was easy to get work. The 
same cannot be said of the current replacement casual workers. The general decline in 
getting job allocation has increase the competition for replacement jobs especially 
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between the regular casual workers and the replacement casual workers. In situations of 
vacancies in other gangs, the regular gang members from the other gangs without job 
allocations are given preferences over the replacement casuals. The headmen who used to 
be very powerful and could make enough income from their clandestine dealings have 
also been affected. Not only had they lost the respect they used to command from the 
gang members, but also have had their incomes dwindling, because the other “ways and 
means” through which they used to make extra incomes have been removed. Secondly, 
they are unlikely candidates to be considered in the event of vacancies in other gang 
groups. His position as a gang leader limits his movement from one gang to another. The 
least affected within the gang is the regular casual workers. This is what an interviewee 
had to say in support of the above analysis: 
 
I overrule the possibility of those on replacement lists getting job allocation on a 
regular basis, in the course of the week, in case of absenteeism. The reason is that 
they are many and it is unlikely that an individual replacement casual worker 
would get job allocation throughout the week. There are between 120 and 150 
people on the replacement list and it is highly impossible that even 50 of them 
would get job to do throughout the week. Hardly do we get frequent vacancies in 
the gangs these days.  Maybe if the gang works continuously throughout the week 
and fatigue crops in or due to injuries, the replacement casuals are then called in. 
But you know the system is very hard economically, everybody wants to be around; 
they don’t want to miss a day’s job. The money is big on weekends, so everybody 
wants to be around during weekends, so hardly do we get vacancies in the gangs 
for those replacement people. For some of them, when they come here for one week 
and they don’t get job allocation, they retreat. Some of the names are just there; we 
don’t know them in person. For the regular gang members, I can say that their 
situations are not all that bad when you compare them to the headmen and the 
replacement casuals.  Despite the fact that we have about 45 different gangs, a 
regular casual of say gang 40 can move to fill a vacancy in gang 33. But the 
headman cannot move. The headmen are not actually involved in the physical 
loading and unloading of cargo. Their function is supervisory in nature and hardly 
do get vacancies in the gangs for such position, they are always around.  
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The General Living Conditions of the Casual Workers 
This section highlights the effects of the dwindling incomes of the casual workers on 
their living conditions in the face of harsh economic conditions. The casual workers 
interviewed gave a picture of a lifestyle that is being lived on the edge. Their take home 
wages hardly take them beyond the gates of the agencies’ premises (refer to page 59, 
whereby after settling their debts they are left with little incomes in their pockets during 
pay days to take home). The sentiments expressed below by an executive member of the 
local union of the casual workers, at GDLC, and a casual worker attest to the general 
deterioration of the living conditions of the casual workers. 
 
We have been taken stock of activities for this year compared to the previous years 
using the financial background of our people. Those days hardly do you see 
members coming to the union for financial assistance but this year it has been 
rampant which tells you that people are worse off. Those days at the end of the 
year when bonuses and leave allowances were paid, some of the casual workers 
could tell you that they were worth about 2 million cedis. Generally, when 
landlords wanted increment in their rents or rent advances, they could quickly 
mobilise funds and pay them. This time they are finding it difficult to pay their rents. 
Then come to talk about school fees, it is one of their headaches. We all know of 
the economic hardships now. The pay is not enough to take care of their daily 
expenses let alone to have something for savings. Some of them are even having 
breaking marriages and other family problems. Sometimes we (the executive 
members of the local union of the casual workers) have to sit in those issues to 
arbitrate to bring the families together. Other times too, we have to go in to help 
financially otherwise you will have broken families. I would say that the welfare of 
our people is in serious crisis. Those days, if you asked headman for 100,000 cedis 
he could offer it to you easily. But now go and ask a headman for 20,000 cedis, it 
would be like adding insults to injuries - our people are suffering and some of us 
when we see them, we cannot look straight into their faces, the situation is pathetic. 
 
The money we receive from here is too small. You imagine only 8 people loading 
5,000 bags of rice and at the end you are worth only about 40,000 cedis.  After 
receiving this amount, it may take you between 3-4 days or even one week before 
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you get another allocation. Some of us have children and wives to cater for, rent to 
pay, electricity and water bills to pay. Even in New Town, when you go to toilet you 
have to pay. You imagine that you have three kids, when you go to toilet you pay 
300 cedis, when you take your bath, you pay 500 cedis, and how much of your 
money you think would be left for food. Transport to and from my place of abode is 
about 3,000 cedis. Some of our colleagues travel all the way from Accra to this 
place so you imagine the sad state of our situation…The injury cases are also a 
border. Paul Dagadu, a car carrier, sustained a serious injury when the wheel of 
the truck they had finished loading, unknown to the driver that he was behind, 
squeezed him. He has been walking around here; not in the position to work again. 
On pay days he comes around and we the friends will say: “‘Charle’ (friend) take 
2,000 cedis, take 1,000 cedis or take 3,000 cedis”.  
 
In the event of heightened deterioration of living conditions, the poor is noted to seek 
refuge in networks of support. In the same vein, Lourenco-Lindell (2002), has observed 
that casual workers in Bissau have developed horizontal networks among themselves to 
survive difficult work conditions. This can be said to be the situation among the casual 
workers in Tema. The we-feeling and the spirit of togetherness that have been developed 
within the gangs and the welfare functions of the local union of the casual workers at 
GDLC can be placed within the domain of networks of supports (work interest-base) that 
enable the casual workers to cope with the deteriorating working conditions. The 
functionality of such networks to the capital accumulation process has been recognised 
(see the theoretical review, pp13-14, Meagher 1995 and Lourenco-Lindell 2002). In this 
way informal networks of the casual workers tend to subsidise the profits of employers in 
the context of intense competition.  
 
It is difficult to determine from the field evidence of the direct connection between the 
retrenchment exercises at the broader national level and casual work at the study area. 
This is probably due to the biases in the selection and the smallness of the number of 
respondents interviewed. However, the case below typifies an example of the influence of 
broader national processes on the condition and career paths of an individual agency 
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casual worker. His career has moved from permanent worker to a regular casual worker 
and finally to an agency casual worker; 
 
Mr. Kweku is 48 years old, born on the 10th of July, 1956.  His highest educational attainment 
was up to Form Four. In 1978, he secured a permanent job with Ghana Sanyo Company as a 
messenger. Due to the economic and political crises that hit the country in the late 70s, he left for 
Nigeria to seek greener pastures. He returned to Ghana in 1982 among about 2 million Ghanaian 
returnees who were repatriated by the Nigerian government. Upon his return, he managed to 
secure employment with Ever Ready Company as a casual worker. After working with the 
company for about three years he was made a permanent staff in 1985. Ever Ready Company was 
declared redundant and in 1991, he was retrenched. Subsequently, he moved from every nook and 
crony in search for a permanent job, but failed. In September, 1992 he registered with the Ghana 
Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) as a casual worker. He worked with GPHA as a regular 
casual worker for 10 years until 2002, when all the casual workers were retrenched as a result of 
the government of Ghana’s avowed port reform programme with support form the IMF and the 
World Bank to make the Tema Port the gateway to West Africa. In the wake of the retrenchment, 
a new company began to recruit casual workers. Left with no alternative he went to register with 
this company. Mr. Kweku is dissatisfied with his new employment arrangement with the agency 
that recruited him but what can he do; there are limited job opportunities in the country now for 
people that belong to his category. According to him the pay he receives as agency casual worker 
is not too good. This is the way he describes his current situation: “here you work so hard and at 
the end of the year they give you something like 35,000 cedis as your leave allowances and 
annual bonus which is woefully insufficient to cater for my family”. He is not very much pleased 
with the agency’s mode of paying wages because in his experience as a casual worker he used to 
receive his pay immediately after work but under the agency it takes 2-3 days before his money is 
paid to him. Once he receives his pay he uses it to settle his debt and still continues to live on 
“carry forward budget”. When it is time to go to work and he makes attempts to board the 
agency’s vehicle to the worksite with Chalewate (slippers), he is refused entry for the reason that 
he does not wear safety boots. Meanwhile they have not provided him with any safety boots. In 
his desperation to earn an income he would then have to walk to the worksite. At work too the 
feeling he gets is that of unwarranted instructions and orders from his bosses which he interprets 
to mean an excessive control from his bosses at work. 
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Job Progression and Supervision at the Worksite 
The evidence gathered in the field suggested few cases of upward employment mobility 
among the casual workers. There were reports of casual workers who used the casual 
work as an entry point or as a stepping stone to secure permanent positions in the 
companies they were contracted or hired to. However such cases are very rare and apply 
to those with higher educational backgrounds. In addition, such individuals in their initial 
stages of entry tend to occupy “the higher echelons of the informal labour regime” which 
in turn acts as a springboard to their upward movement. The reaction of an official in the 
port business to the issue of job progression was that they often: 
 
Come across some of the casuals who have very good educational background but 
for this group of casuals they use the gang system as an entry point. Within a short 
time, they get themselves into other companies. The entry point to the port is the 
gang system. The moment you get a gang you start going to the port and also starts 
making contacts. I know of a gang member who now works with a maritime 
insurance company. Some of them come around to see their friends, those who 
helped them in the initial stages. I know of another guy who was a casual clerk at 
car park, a university graduate, who as a result of his links with other companies, 
he is now a shipping officer with one of the shipping lines. 
 
To other gang casual workers, the highest stage they could reach is the position of a 
headman or he would tend to enjoy some permanent status if his gang is made a 
permanent/special one. Some of the headmen interviewed expected the client companies 
to consider them to the positions of a foreman or supervisor. According to them the 
experience they have acquired over the years equally makes them eligible for those 
positions. The observation in the field was that the headmen, in practical terms, performs 
greater part of the supervisory role in the field. In the scheme of things, the headmen 
should have been given the opportunity to progress to either a foreman or supervisor. The 
chain of progression, they suggested, should have been a movement from ordinary 
labourer, to the headman and finally to foreman. “But the highest you can go is the 
headman. However, when you go to GPHA, there are examples whereby casuals have 
moved through the ranks to supervisors” (interview with a headman).   
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 I have worked as a casual worker in this gang system for close to 11 years. I have 
gained some experience. The people I’m working with now are new. I’m now 
training them. For experience, I can say that I should be made foreman. The way 
Ghana is today, if you don’t know anybody you can’t get to that high position. 
When there is any promotion, those of us who have worked for a long time would 
not be considered. They would go and bring somebody from somewhere and 
introduce him as our foreman, who for instance could not tell where the port is 
situated. Sometimes, when you go to work, this foreman would say to you the 
headman: “Master I’m a new person; see to it that the boys do the job properly”. 
Instead of us taking instructions from him, he rather seeks directions from us as to 
how the job should be done. This situation can be likened to a school; it is the 
teacher that teaches the students but not the students that teaches the teacher 
(interview with a headman). 
 
We have begun proposing for a system where the foremen would come from this 
company. As far as job specification and instruction are concerned, the foreman 
that would be appointed from our outfit would liaise with the client companies to 
ensure smooth flow of information to the headmen and finally to the gang members. 
Ideally, that is how the chain should have been. Because we don’t have something 
of that nature there is always a problem. Sometimes when you go to meet some of 
the foremen at the worksite, the conclusion one can draw is that they are square 
pegs in round holes. In a bid of our people trying to direct them the right way of 
doing the job to enhance the work, superiority complex crops in and it creates a lot 
of problems. You will find some of the foremen flexing their muscle on the workers, 
because they think they are the powers that be, they talk to them anyhow and 
sometimes meet out inhuman treatments to them (an official from GDLC).  
 
The seeming conflict between the headmen and some of the foremen can safely be 
attributed to the frustrations faced by the headmen, who regard themselves as having 
enough working experience to progress to the top. The reason for maintaining the 
foremen at the worksite is probably due to the eagerness of the client companies to 
maintain some control over the casual workers. It is unlikely that the status quo would 
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change against the backdrop that supervising the casual workers hired from GDLC was 
becoming increasingly difficult. Some responses from the casual workers as well as the 
few officials of some of the client companies go to add credence to the increasing 
difficulty the client companies are encountering in supervision and control particularly at 
the worksite. However, on the whole and at the level of the labour hire intermediary, the 
control over the casual workers has increased. 
Supervision is becoming a bit difficult for us as the labour is coming from a 
different outfit. The casual workers we hire from the agency are insensitive to the 
plight of the company. For instance, previously we used to have what we called 
“work to finish”- that is a situation where the workers stayed a little while and 
finish the small quantum of work that would have been left undone even though 
their 12 hour working hours would have elapsed - but these days as soon as they 
achieve their target, they leave the worksite irrespective of whatever quantity of 
work is left to be finished. This was not the case when we used to have our own 
regular casual worker (an official of a company that patronises labour from 
GDLC).   
       
Until we were retrenched as casual workers from, GHPA, none of us could have 
the urge to refuse to follow the foreman’s instructions to perform certain jobs. I 
knew that if I fail to clear whatever work I’m instructed to do and the foreman 
reports me to the operations manager, I would be in trouble. But now the casual 
workers know the companies hire them from dock labour so if they do not obey the 
instructions of the foreman or even insult him, he knows that the following day he 
would go to another company (a response from a casual worker). 
 
Those days there were companies that when they came to look for casual workers, 
the workers would decline to follow them, there were nothing they could do to them. 
But now once the agency says you are going to work for say Company A, you can’t 
protest, whether raining or shining. In those days the workers were free to choose 
whoever they wanted to work with. So at the end of the day it was the company that 
offered good working conditions that attracted the hard working and the 
experienced workers. Those companies that could not offer what others were 
giving found themselves in the fix. Maybe they needed four gangs on board a cargo 
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vessel, but because of their attitude, they could raise only two gangs (an executive 
member of the casual workers union). 
 
The two sides to labour flexibility strategy are that it may deepen or weaken employers’ 
supervision and control over employees, a position that is held by Peck: “while external 
flexibility favors some forms of labour control…it simultaneously 
undermines…supervision” (1996:128). Generally, hiring of casual workers through 
intermediaries in Tema has increased the distance between employers and the workers 
and hence the control over the workers. On the other hand, at least at the worksite, the 
casual workers are finding their voices and are becoming more assertive - this applies in 
particular to those casual workers employ through GDLC. In such a situation it can be 
deduced that the presence of the foremen at the worksite is nothing more than another 
stretch of arm of control by employers to get a grip over the casual workers, if their role 
is practically performed by the headmen, who are deemed more experience.  Figure 1 
illustrates the structure of the organisation of casual workers, as it pertains to Tema 
Harbour.  
 
Client Companies            Figure 1 
 
Headmen (middlemen & gang Leaders)                                             
                                                                                                              
 
         
Regular gang members                            
                                                                Replacement casuals          
                                                                 (Entry into the gang system from the bottom) 
 
The organisation and structure of casual workers as it pertains to warehouses and the harbour in Tema. 
Arrows facing downwards represent the arm of control, and upwards the path of progression in the gang. In 
the case of the Main Harbour, the structure has been modified as a result of the establishment of GDLC; 
however the structure as depicted by figure 1 is incorporated into its operation. The insertion of the agency 
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has increased the distance between the employers and the employee, but has not decreased employers 
control over the workers.       
                                   
In the case of GDLC, the practice that is becoming famous is the situation whereby some 
of the client companies repeatedly request for gangs that are either tagged special or 
permanent gang. Whilst the former are still maintained under the agency and are 
repeatedly booked by the client, the latter are maintained permanently at the clients 
offices, with the role of the agency merely in the area of managing the pay rolls of such 
casual workers. A case in point is the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority and Ghacem 
(a cement producing company), which has some permanent/special gangs with GDLC. 
The advantage here to the special gangs, unlike those who belong to the pool of casual 
workers and whose gangs had to be on the allocation queue for a long period, is that they 
are immediately booked for work anytime the client has job for them regardless of 
whether it is their turn on the allocation queue or not. The inbuilt discipline, the 
experience, the team work and the adaptation of the special gangs to the work ethics of 
the firm are the areas the client companies benefit from. This is what a member of a 
special gang, who works for Ghacem, had to say:  
 
…the foreman says that there are some people that if they take to the worksite 
they create confusion. He says he does not want that to happen that is why they 
have maintained our gang. According to him, keeping our gang enables him to 
know us better so should in case something happen he will know what to do. 
For two years now since we started work with Ghacem there has not been any 
confusion between us and them -“all day good”. They like the way we work 
that is why they have not changed our gang. Gang 40 and my gang, 41 have 
been working with Ghacem as permanent gang (interview with a gang 
member). 
 
Health and Safety Issues 
The intermediary hire agents contacted indicated that they provide safety apparels to their 
hired workers, for which they charge the client companies, or have entered into some 
agreements for the client companies to provide them. From the perspectives of the casual 
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workers, the claim by the agencies to provide safety apparels does not fully match what is 
in practice; 
 
When it comes to protective clothing, they are not doing well for us. For 
more than a year or two, overalls (mostly needed for night shifts), safety 
boots, helmets and gloves have not been provided. Sometimes when we 
go to the field and see the nature of the job, we talk directly to the 
owners that the job needs certain safety apparels and as human as they 
are they listen and organise such things for us. But for some companies 
they would not accede to our complaints. They would demand that we 
undertake the task regardless of how we manage to do it.  Sometimes too, 
they refer us to the agency, claiming that they have paid the agency to 
provide those things. 
     Sometimes, when we go to work, certain jobs that we are suppose to 
use forklifts, they force us to perform them manually. If you dare 
complain they would say: “Hei! You no bi from dock labour, make you 
do am” (Pidgin English, meaning that regardless of the risky nature of 
the job, as long as we are from dock labour we ought to do it). The work 
we do here is very risky. For instance, instead of allowing us to use 
cages to perform certain tasks, they would bring spreaders and ask us to 
stand on them to perform the tasks. The accident reports are 
unimaginable. There was an instance where a worker fell from a truck 
and when he reported the accident, he was told that since blood did not 
gash out, there was no accident and therefore was not given insurance 
even though the guy suffered from internal bleeding.  
The gloves they gave us have been destroyed. They have given us 
helmets but they are of low quality. If you wear them to work, within five 
minutes you would remove them because they are poorly aerated and 
uncomfortable. They have given some friends singlet and I.D. cards but 
they are in the minority. There are occasions that they would say “no I.D. 
cards no work”. It is not we the workers who have to look for I.D. cards 
ourselves. It is the same people who say “no I.D. card no work” who are 
suppose to provide us with the cards. During certain periods, those of us 
without I.D. cards would not be booked for work (the underlying intent 
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of the issuance of I.D. cards to few individuals is probably nothing more 
than a strategy to ration jobs during lean seasons).  
     Our main problem here is that they don’t provide us with safety 
boots. Most of the injuries at this place are leg-related. Some of our 
colleagues have suffered serious leg injuries. When you report to 
management, they would ask why the person didn’t wear safety boots, 
meanwhile, it is them who have to provide them, but they don’t provide 
them. We are told that the client companies are charged for safety 
apparels including safety boots. When it comes to the discharge of 
hazardous cargo such as ammonium products and cotton seeds, the 
effusions and the dusts that emanate from them affect our eyes. When you 
go the worksite, you will see people working bare-footed. The money 
they give us is insufficient – it is used to buy food and nothing is left for 
savings to buy safety boots which cost about 250,000 cedis.  We expect 
that they give us rain coats. Sometimes when we are booked to the 
worksite and it happens to rain, we work in the rain without rain coats. 
When you get sick, they give you a form to go to the hospital. But at the 
hospital we are not given any proper medicine. They give you 
paraceutamol and volume 5. Previously, we could request directly from 
the companies for safety boots, but under our current arrangement with 
the agency it cannot be done. There were certain occasions that we 
asked the companies for safety boots, but their answer was that they have 
paid the monies for safety boots to the agency.  
 
The Drive for the Services of the Labour Intermediary Agents 
The natural reaction by the casual workers to their not too good employment conditions 
would have been to bypass the labour intermediaries, but their lack of contacts, the 
frustrations associated with job search and the limited job opportunities, make the 
services of the labour intermediaries indispensable. In fact it is a choice between two 
evils - either stay home unemployed with nothing to feed oneself and the family or work 
through the labour intermediaries to get some income to subsist on, and the latter 
seemingly appeals to them. When the workers were asked why their continued reliance 
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on the labour intermediaries, despite the lack of improvement in their employment 
conditions, their responses were as follows; 
 
Now there are no jobs available, so if I leave dock labour today, it means I’m 
going to stay in the house. Even though I get the feeling that they are exploiting me, 
but I can’t sit in the house and starve to death nor engage in theft. The only thing I 
can do is to put my face in water and do this work till the time that I would get a 
better place or job elsewhere to do. 
 
I’m not very satisfy under the conditions I work, but the situation in Ghana is such 
that if you leave you won’t get a job to do so you have no option than to make do 
with what is available. 
       Similarly, another casual worker who wanted to apply directly to work with a 
certain multinational company could not get it until he applied through L’aine 
Services. He indicated the indispensability of getting job at the company through 
the agency: 
 Without L’aine Services, you can’t get a job there. A manager friend at the 
company told me that they don’t take casual workers directly unless I apply 
through L’aine Services. Accordingly, I went to register with the agency and after a 
while they called me and told me that they had secured a job in the said 
multinational company for me. 
 
As indicated under the method section, it was difficult to get the client companies, except 
few, to interview. However, as it can be gathered from the above empirical analyses, 
implicitly or explicitly, the motivation on the part of firms to seek contract or casual 
workers through labour intermediaries is partly cost related. When he was asked as to 
whom he thinks are the greatest beneficiaries of their services, an official from GDLC at 
the Main Harbour, responded that the client companies benefit most from their services.  
When he was asked further to be specific, he indicated that the client enterprises are 
saved from the administrative cost of managing the casual workers. In this instance, the 
client companies cannot be said to benefit enormously from wage cost reduction which is 
generally the case for hiring casual workers directly or indirectly through an agent - 
allowances and other benefits are factored into the payments made to the agency. For 
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every worker that they hire from GDLC, they pay a premium and this premium 
supposedly caters for the workers medical care, safety apparels, and other benefits. There 
is the possibility of the agency benefiting from the premium it charges to the client 
companies, which in turn depends on the extent to which it manages the welfare benefits 
meant for the casual workers. The profit comes from the premium they charge the clients 
and this is possible only when administrative expenses and other areas related to safety, 
medical bills and allowances are well managed. In this instance, they may get some 
marginal profit (interview with an executive member of the local union of the casual 
workers). Pre-financing salaries of the casual workers by the labour intermediaries is 
another benefit that accrues to the client companies. Besides cost related benefits, under 
this system, the workers don’t agitate so much and also we are able to move them from 
one enterprise to another with ease (an interview with an official at L’aine Services). 
Thus recruiting through labour intermediary makes labour more flexible with the added 
advantage of reducing labour agitations. The advantages of wage cost reduction and the 
breaking of labour activism embedded in flexible informal labour practices are the beliefs 
the structuralists share. 
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                                                   Chapter Six  
                                                  Conclusion 
                                                   
The study was about the activities of labour intermediaries in Tema, and their influence 
on the employment conditions of the informal labour, in particular, casual or contract 
workers. The study examined the truism in the perspective that recruiting labour 
externally through intermediaries, representing the institutionalisation of the recruitment 
of casual workers, tends to formalise the employment conditions of the workers. The 
syntheses of the various discourses on the process of informalisation and flexible labour 
strategies were used as the frame for reviewing the macro processes of informality in 
Ghana and the micro analyses of the flexible informal labour in Tema.                                                              
    The Ghanaian informality was constructed spanning from the colonial to contemporary 
times. The intent is to regard informality as a historical process and not a recent creation. 
As discussed in chapter three, the main variables used to trace the origin of informality in 
Ghana during the colonial and the immediate post colonial periods are the content of the 
educational policy, the characteristics of students churned out of school and the failure of 
the modern economy to absorb the school leavers. Large pools of school leavers from 
towns and villages, alienated from their immediate social settings by virtue of their 
formal education, trek to the urban centres. The inadequacy of their skills and training 
made it very difficult for most of the school leavers to locate white-collar jobs in the 
formal sector. Besides, the formal economy was not robust enough and less diversified 
occupationally to absorb such a large pool of labour force. Those who failed to secure 
formal employment had to subsist at the margins of the urban economy, called the 
informal sector. This marginalist conjuncture was proved to be insufficient in explaining 
informality in Ghana. An enthusiasm was expressed in the Ghanaian informal sector in 
the 1970s as representing an ingenious realm with employment potentials for a number of 
individuals, especially those whose educational backgrounds disqualify them for 
employment in the formal sector, willing to take up jobs in this sector.  The challenge to 
this perspective has been that it fails to capture the relationships between informal 
economic activities and indigenous and international capital (see discussion under the 
alternative structuralist perspective in chapter two). 
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      The actions and inactions of the state vis-à-vis the retrenchment exercises 
implemented during the “neo-liberal epochs”(1966-1972 and 1983-beyond see the 
discussions in chapter three) are also another dimension to the expansion of the informal 
realm in Ghana. The bureaucratic policies of the Nkrumah and the Acheampong regimes 
led to inefficient and bloated public sector. The governments that succeeded these 
regimes capitalized on such inefficiencies in the public sector, and with the blessing of 
international financial institutions put a freeze on or down-sized public sector 
employment. These led to the expulsion of a number of workers especially, the unskilled 
and the semi-skilled staffs from, and non-absorption of new low-skilled workers unless 
highly necessary into, the formal sector. The large pool of retrenched workers, especially 
during the late 80s, added to the existing pool of labour force engaged in some sort of 
informal activities. The interpretation to the large army of labour in the informal realm, 
from the structuralist perspective, is that it affords capital the advantage to cheapen the 
cost of labour in the bid to maximise profits.  
 
The growth of Tema is a direct consequence of its integration into the global economy 
through the construction of the harbour, the building of the township and the 
establishment of a number of modern industries. The modernisation process in Tema, in 
turn instigated other processes. Some individuals were excluded right from the 
commencement of the process. The indigenous people during the resettlement process 
were asking the government officials why they were not considered for the new houses 
that were being built at the new Tema Township, instead of relocating them to the new 
site; Manhean. This was an issue that was difficult for the officials to address. For the 
new immigrants, they did not even qualify to live at Manhean; their lots were woods and 
corrugated sheets, retrieved form demolished houses, to build their abode at Ashaiman, 
which incidentally has grown to become a cheap source of labour to support economic 
activities in Tema. The influx of immigrants at the teething face of the projects has been 
noted. Most of the immigrants during the 1960 trekked to Tema for employment 
opportunities that were being offered by the construction of the harbour and the township. 
The over-supply of labour force as against the availability of jobs in Tema became more 
evident as the building projects tapered off. To the worker with apprenticeship skills, the 
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effect was that of irregular employment instead of continuous unemployment resulting 
from the on-and-off nature of the building projects. During periods of bust, unskilled 
work was deemed as an alternative, even for the skilled worker. The Labour Office which 
was established by law to recruit semi-skilled and unskilled workers began to suffer from 
loss of confidence, as periods of joblessness lengthened.  
 
The recruitment of temporary or casual workers through labour intermediaries is 
emerging in Ghana, at least the more institutionalised ones. Even though recent, the case 
in Tema exemplifies that, especially at the Main Harbour and the Fishing Harbour, the 
processes and structures leading to their emergence are rooted in time. The old gang 
system, which was loosely tied to the defunct Labour Office, is still functional. Ghana 
Dock Labour Company and NFSA, in their inventiveness have adopted the gang system. 
The gang, which is constituted of headmen, the regular casual workers and the 
replacement casual workers, provides the structure for the mobilisation and management 
of casual workers by these labour intermediaries. The significant changes are in the areas 
of redefinition of roles and conditions of work of these categories of casual workers. The 
mediating roles of the headmen have been usurped by these agencies, which mean the 
benefits they used to enjoy through the manipulation of the gangs have eluded them. 
However, they still work as the leaders of the gangs. They have maintained the leadership 
role because of the advantage these labour intermediaries derive from the working 
experience the headmen have acquired over the years. The replacement casual workers 
are greatly affected in terms of getting regular jobs. The “open-door” policy of, for 
instance, GDLC has increased the competition between the regular casual workers and 
the replacement casuals and in the process; the regular casual workers become the 
preferred candidates in the event of vacancies in other gangs. Informality in Tema, 
significantly correlates to Lourenco-Lindell’s (2002) observation that whilst the process 
of informality pertaining to Bissau, on one hand, corresponds to the flexibilisation and 
informalisation strategies occurring at the global level, it on the other hand takes up local 
specificities, deriving from the historical context and the position of the country and the 
city in the regional and global economy. 
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An interesting dimension to casual work at the Main Harbour is that most of the casual 
workers have worked on a regular basis as casual workers, for more than a decade and it 
is common to hear some of the respondents using the term permanent casuals. There was 
rare incidence of progression from casual or contract worker to higher positions. Those 
who did were individuals with higher level of education and casual work was used as an 
entry point to the job market. For most of the casual workers the highest rank they can 
reach is the headman in the particular case of Tema Main Harbour. There is also the 
seeming conflict between the headmen and foremen of the client companies, which 
patronise casual workers from GDLC. The headmen regard themselves as more 
experienced and in the scheme of things would have been considered for promotion to 
foremen. Their inability to progress has thus brought about the tension between them and 
the foremen. The intermediary agents at best may ensure a continuous employment or 
employment on regular basis (but intermittent job allocations) for some months or even 
years for the casual/temporary worker but rarely ensure a movement from 
temporary/casual employment to permanent employment.  
 
The contract of employment of the agency casual workers exist either in oral or written 
form. The GDLC casual workers unlike the temporary workers from L’aine Services do 
not have written employment contracts. Their contract terms are informally constructed; 
however, their new arrangements with the agency have increased their awareness about 
their work entitlements, an improvement over their previous situation. This awareness 
has been made possible through the local union of the casual workers (see analysis in 
pp57-58). The factory hand workers from L’aine Services do have written employment 
contract, but the terms do not eliminate their job insecurity. 
 
The wages of the agency casual workers are not uniform. It varies across and within 
agencies. One unique feature of casual work in Tema is that some of the casual workers 
have historically enjoyed benefits such as annual bonuses and leave allowances, thus 
contradicting the general belief that casual workers lack remunerative benefits. This does 
not apply to all the labour intermediary agents covered in the study, neither does it hold 
for those gang groups, which operate in warehouses in Tema. Such benefits as transport 
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allowances leave allowances, annual bonuses and social security payments are offered to 
the casual workers, in the case of GDLC. Superficially, the wages offered to the casual 
workers exceeds the national minimum wage; however, the evidence from the interviews 
suggested dwindling and irregular incomes, including allowances. The increasing 
irregularity and the lack of multiple sources of casual work underpin this trend.  This is in 
turn influenced by the increasing number of people seeking casual work; bringing in its 
wake increased competition among them for casual job. Whilst the general difficulty of 
getting a job in the formal sector or the lack of capital to begin small ventures in the 
informal sector may account for the mounting number of people seeking casual job with 
its attendant effect on the frequency of getting casual job, there is also another localised 
reason to this, in the particular case of GDLC. In contrast to the old gang system mode of 
restricting entry into the informal labour market at Tema Main Harbour, the agency rather 
operates open door entry into the casual labour regime leading to the artificial creation of 
a large reserve of casual workers. The majority of the agency casual workers attributed 
the lack of securing regular job allocation to this artificial creation of large reserve of 
casual workers by the agency.  
      To most of the informal workers, the difficulty in securing formal wage opportunities 
and the constraints they face in taking up other informal sector activities, make casual 
work the only source of income. “This is a kind of labour that merchant capital has been 
historically keen to employ…but can also be said to constitute one type of ‘flexible 
labour’, the kind of jobs being created by global capital in cities of the developing world 
today”(Lourenco-Lindell 2002:229). This confirms my contention of singularity and 
irregularity of informal work as a source of income and challenges Hart’s position on 
multiplicity of income sources available to the individual urban worker (see page 33). 
      The connection between the work place and home is amply demonstrated by the 
agency casual workers. Their dwindling incomes hardly take them home. As a result they 
are faced with range of problems including threats of breaking marriages, difficulties of 
paying their children’s school fees, payment of house rents and the problem of raising 
money for transport fares to and from work. Incidentally, most of these agency workers 
live in poor and slums areas in Accra and Tema, where they turn to pay more for utilities 
such as water. Meeting daily expenses is difficult for some of these workers, especially 
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when payments for the work done are not effected daily. They often resort to borrowing 
to meet their daily expenses. During pay days, in real terms, the monies they receive do 
not stay in their pockets. They have to pay their debts and continue to live on borrowed 
money or as one interviewee put it: live on carry forward budgets. The emotional and 
financial support the casual workers enjoy from their friends in the gang group and, in the 
particular case of the GDLC, the local union of the casual workers, to some extent turn to 
cushion them against deteriorating employment and living conditions. Such work 
interest-based social networks also ensure that the labour power of these agency workers 
is appropriated at the highest level by the employers, thus confirming the functionality of 
survival networks to capital accumulation under deteriorating economic conditions (refer 
to chapter 2 for the discourse on the utility of informal support to informal labour and 
capital accumulation in time of crisis). 
 
The issue of safety and health related issues come to the fore. There was a minimal 
adherence to the provision of safety apparels by either the labour intermediaries or the 
client companies. The non-provision of the safety wares poses a great challenge to the 
safety and health of the agency casual workers. Most of the accident cases, according to 
the respondents, were related either to the non-use of safety wares or lack of experience/ 
inadequate training in handling certain risky tasks. 
 
It can be stated, not forgetting the limitations of this study, that an attempt to formalise 
the informal labour, through the insertion of labour intermediaries, has tended to 
excruciate instead of eliminating the difficult employment and economic conditions of 
the temporary or casual workers. This study, like others ( see pp19-21 Endresen 2000, 
Lourenco-Lindell 2002, Streefkerk 2002, Breman 2004) challenges the view that 
resorting to flexible labour practices, such as employing through intermediary agents, 
tends to formalise work.  
      There seem to be opportunities for improvement in the activities of the labour 
intermediaries at least for those individuals who view them as indispensable, even in its 
emerging state. Some of the respondents covered in the interviews gave hints as to the 
way forward to improve the activities of the labour intermediary agencies. For instance, 
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due to the strenuous nature of some of the tasks they perform, the gang members who 
work through GDLC suggested either a reduction in the tonnage of cargo they load and 
unload, or increase the size of the gang members to handle the 250 tonnes cargo. Again, 
since the casual workers perform manual jobs entailing lifting, their suggestion was for 
the agency to organise training programmes on how to lift heavy goods. Knowing that 
opening the gates of registration into the informal labour market decreases their chance of 
getting regular jobs, their recommendation is for the agency to revert to the old way of 
doing things - restrict entry. This option is less likely to be adopted by the agencies. The 
reason is that their control over the labour process is derived from creating such excess 
labour pool, which is made possible by the teaming number of the unemployed who walk 
to their premises to register. 
    The Republic of Ghana Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) recognises and spells out the 
conditions of engagement of casual or temporary workers. Section 75(1) stipulates that “a 
temporary worker who is employed by the same employer for a continuous period of six 
month and more shall be treated under this Part as a permanent worker”. Clearly it would 
be difficult to bring temporary or casual workers employed through labour intermediary 
agencies under the umbrella of this Act, the reason being that such temporary workers are 
often in the books of the labour intermediary agencies and are hired off-the books of the 
employers. Employers therefore cannot be compelled to give them permanent 
employment status, even if they are generous enough to keep them in employment 
continuously for six months and more. 
    Alternatively, the various gang groups, including those operating in warehouses, and 
the casual workers union of GDLC could be coalesced for public action to exert pressure 
to demand a better share of the wealth they help to create. However, the vulnerability of 
the casual workers and the precariousness of their employment relations make any 
scaling up action practically difficult unless they receive material support in their lives, 
for “when the urban poor do engage in scaled-up public action, either in low-income 
areas or around workplace or interest-based issues, they may rock the boat”(Beall 
2001:1020). 
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                                             Appendices 
 
 Appendix 1: Questionnaire  
 
Casual/Temporary worker 
 
   
  
  
  
 
 Sex  Age  Formal 
education 
Other skills 
specify 
 
 Male  
  
Female  
 Non  
 
Primary  
 
Secondary  
 
Tertiary  
 
Vocational  
  
    
2)  Have you been in any form of employment before? Or do you work elsewhere. Yes   
No  
 
a) If yes, what type of work is/was it? And where is/ was it? 
  
b)  Did you use agent in finding your previous or the other job? Yes   No  
  
3) How did you come to know this current agent? And why did you rely on that channel? 
 
4)  Was there any special reason for registering with this labour agent? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
5)  Do you have any commitment towards the agent? 
 
a) What is the nature of the commitment? 
i) Financial 
        
     ii) In kind (specify……………..) 
 
       b) If it is a financial commitment, how much do you pay?...................... 
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           i) How is the money paid to the agent? 
               a) Deduction at source 
 
               b) Other means (specify………..) 
 
            ii) If the money is deducted at source, are you satisfied with the deduction? Yes 
No 
 
6)  How are you paid? Monthly, weekly, daily, hour. 
 
7) Can you state the amount you are paid per day? ………………… 
 
8) Do you enjoy any benefits from the firm you work for other than pay? Mention the 
type of benefit…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
9) Is there any kind of agreement or contract between you and the agent? Yes     No 
 
        i) If there is a contract, what is the length of the contract?........................................... 
 
       ii) Is there any item in the contract would you want change? Mention it and give the 
reason. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
10) How often do you get work?........................................ 
 
11) What exactly do you do at this worksite? 
 
12) Is there any kind of skill needed in doing what you do? If yes, what kind of skill?  
 
13) Were you given any training in connection to what you do? If no how did you come 
to learn the skill? 
 
14) Is the work you do here in a way related to your previous job? 
 
 
15) Whom do you report your grievances to? 
 
a) The agent  
b) The enterprise I work with? 
 
16) If it is the agent, why not the 
firm?.......................................................................................................................................
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................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................... 
 
17) How are your grievances at the workplace addressed?.................................................... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….... 
 
18) Are you satisfied with the condition under which you work?  Yes      No 
 
19)  If no, what are the conditions that you are dissatisfied 
with?.......................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................ 
 
20) Why did you decide to register with or sought the work through the agent instead of 
applying directly to the 
firm? ......................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................. 
 
21) Do you intend to continue to work with the firm under the current arrangements with 
the agent? Yes or No, explain your 
answer. ..................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
..... 
 
22) Do you think your relationship with the agent has been helpful? Yes   No 
 
a) If yes, can you tell how helpful they have been to you? 
 
b)  If no, what problems would you have faced if you had not use the agent? 
 
23) Has there been any occasion that you wish you had not entered into any arrangements 
with the agent? If yes, what might be the reason? 
 
24) Any information you think I should have which we have not talked about. 
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The Labour agents/ agencies 
 
1) The type of agent:  a) bosses of work- gangs   b) firm-like agencies 
2) How long have your group or outfit been in business? 
 
3) What kind of business are you involved in? 
 
4)  Do you have many client enterprises? 
 
i) In what category do they belong to? Is it service industry or production industry? 
 
  ii)  Which one would you consider constitute your major client?..................................... 
 
5) Can you mention the specific service or production industry that you serve? 
 
6) How many would-be workers are you able to offer employment annually, monthly or 
daily? 
7) How many active workers do you have in your books? 
 
8) How many workers are you able to supply on demand? 
 
9) Do the workers enter into any contractual agreement with you or your agency? 
 
10) If yes, what is entailed in the 
agreement? ............................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
........... 
 
 11) If you have any agreement with the client enterprise, what are some of your 
obligations in the agreement? 
 
12) Are there instances whereby those workers on short-term duration contracts obtain 
long-term contracts? 
 
13) Who in your opinion benefits most from your activities? Is it your client enterprises 
or the workers? 
 
14) Can you give specific benefits you think either the firm or the worker derives from 
your activities? 
 
15) By what means do you get people to register with your company? 
 
16) If it is by a specific means, why do you rely on that means? 
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17) What is the most common channel(s) used by the workers to contact you or your 
outfit? 
 
18) Whose responsibility is it to administer the workers’ pay roll? 
 
i) If it is your outfit, what goes into determining the net wage or salary of the workers? 
 
ii) What does it mean to your outfit to administer the payroll? 
 
19) Does your outfit have preferences for certain characteristics of the people screen for 
employment? And why? 
 
20) Any mention of some of the characteristics of the people you screen for employment?  
 
21) What category of labour you mostly supply clients? Is it skilled, semi-skilled or 
unskilled? 
 
22) To whom do they report their grievances?.......................................... 
 
23) If it is your outfit, through what channels are these grievances addressed? 
 
24) Which area of your operations do you think is growing and what might be the 
possible reason for the growth? 
 
25) What in your opinion are some of your outfit most challenging situations in your 
relationships with both clients and the workers? 
 
26) Apart from wages or salaries are there any other benefits you give to the workers 
 
27) Whose responsibility is it to ensure that the workers perform jobs under good 
working conditions? 
 
28) Does your outfit have any control over the conditions under which they work? 
 
29) Do your clients have any control over the people supply them? 
 
30) If yes, what kind of control/authority do your clients exercise over the workers you 
supply them? 
 
31) If no, why don’t they exercise any control/authority over them and whose duty is it to 
ensure that the workers perform their work? 
 
32) If your outfit is able to arrange a permanent employment for the temporary workers, 
do they still remain in your books? 
  
33) What goes into determining the selection of a particular worker to a permanent status?  
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34) Do those who obtain permanent employment have any commitments towards your 
agency? 
 
35) If they have, what   kind of commitment is it? 
 
36) Apart from economic, what do you think are the other reasons that make people seek 
employment through this agency? 
 
37) Has there been any occasion whereby there have been any disagreements between 
your outfit and the workers? In your opinion what might have been the cause of the 
disagreement? And how was it dealt with? 
 
38) Any information you think I should have which we have not talked about. 
 
 
Client Companies 
 
1) Since when have you been in business with this agent? 
 
2) Is the agent able to meet your orders in time? 
 
3) How often do your company make request to the agent? 
 
4) During what periods or occasions does your company make such request to the 
agent? 
 
5) Does your company have any special reasons for making such request on a 
particular occasion? 
 
6) What do you think will make your company choose to employ workers through 
the agents instead of the traditional way of recruitment? 
 
7) What are the economic and the social advantages your company derives from 
relying on agent employees? 
 
 
8) Do your company request for particular labour with certain characteristics? What 
are these characteristics? And what is the reason behind it? 
 
9) Does your company have any contractual bond with the workers supply to you or 
the agent? 
 
10) If yes, can you be specific on the nature of the contract? 
 
11) If no, how does it affect your relations with the workers? 
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12) Has there been any occasion where there has been disagreement between your 
company and the workers supplied by the agent? 
 
13) If yes, what might have triggered the disagreement? And how was it addressed? 
 
Do you see your company relying more on agent employees in the near future? Explain 
your answer? 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Report on demonstrating Tema casual workers carried by The Ghanaian Chronicle. 
 
 
Previous Article
 
Next Article
 General News of Thursday, 30 May 2002 
Calm Returns to Tema Port 
WORK HAS resumed at the Tema Port after 'pampered' Ghana Ports and Harbours 
Authority (GPHA) casual workers compelled the authority to temporarily close down. 
 
The peace was achieved when police have to fire tear gas and rubber bullets to ward off 
threatening dock workers whose activities endangered the port installations. 
 
It all began on Tuesday when former casual workers of the Tema Port blocked the main 
entrance, preventing vehicular movement in and out and proceeded to stop stevedoring 
workers of the Atlantic Ports Services (APS) and Speedline from discharging cargoes 
from the vessels. 
 
This was because what was considered as 'hand shakes' for them by the GPHA was not 
enough. 
 
The casuals union leadership after a meeting at the Labour Department reportedly 
informed their colleagues of alleged unpleasant statements made by GPHA management 
officials that incensed them into action. 
 
Numbering about 1000, the former casuals, some of whom had been absorbed by the new 
stevedoring companies trooped from one end of the port to the other singing war songs. 
 
Their union leaders attempted taming them but in the end one of the leaders was rather 
beaten. On Wednesday, security buildup of the Port was called to test. 
 
Backed by two multi-purpose vehicles (MPV), the police fired tear gas and rubber bullets 
to scare the surging workers. 
 
Having exhausted their patience, police chased them outside the port to about 300 meters 
beyond the harbour perimeter and created a buffer zone. 
 
 97
The Director General of GPHA, Mr. Ben Owusu Mensah, was quoted as saying that the 
casuals whose action was illegal have abused privileges that they enjoyed from the 
GPHA. 
 
According to him, the workers were casuals and should have been treated as casuals but 
for a very long time, this generosity was extended to them so it became the status quo. 
 
The Director General said that the GPHA paid about ¢20 billion to 4,700 casual workers 
at both Tema and Takoradi last week as 'hand shakes' because they are not entitled to 
severance awards. 
 
He stated that the authorities have a strong conviction that there are people behind the 
inciting of the casuals. 
 
Owusu Mensah said that prior to payments of these hand shakes, about 6,000 names were 
presented as casuals but investigation led to the discovery of ghost names. 
 
During screening, 2,100 names were ghost names detected leaving 3,900 for the Tema 
Port alone. 
 
The suspicion, he said, is that architects of the ghost names are the same people who are 
dousing the former casuals to create a state of insecurity at the Port. 
 
Alhaji Asuma Banda, a shipping magnate and board member of GPHA called for 
discipline within the maritime industry. 
 
He wants maritime workers to channel their worries through their local Maritime Dock 
Workers Union (MDC). 
 
Alhaji Banda said the casuals seem to have been pampered over the years, hence they can 
hold the nation's revenue live wire to ransom anytime.
 
 
 
Appendix 3: A sample of the terms of contract of a temporary worker 
We are pleased to offer you employment with L’aine Service as a Factory Hand on 
contract basis with effect from 7th January, 2002 to 31st March, 2002. You will be 
assigned to work at A Company (the name of company withheld). 
 
This appointment is renewable upon expiration depending on satisfactory performance 
and good conduct, continuous good health and the availability of the contract to L’aine 
Services. Your appointment will be subject to the following broad terms and condition: 
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• You will be responsible to the factory Manager for any duties assigned to you. 
• Your remuneration will be based on an hourly rate of 3,050.00($0.34), subject to 
tax, irrespective of whether you work during weekends or week days or holidays. 
• You will be required to contribute 5% of your monthly salary to the social 
security scheme. 
• We have been made aware that the production system at company A is that your 
working hours will be irregular. Also due to the nature of factory work, your 
appointment during the period of the contract may be terminated without notice. 
• All queries related to remuneration and other related work issues are to be 
directed to L’aine Services. Management reserves the right to terminate the 
appointment of anyone who contravenes this rule without notice in order to 
maintain discipline amongst the staff. 
 
 
Appendix 4: Wages and allowances of GDLC casual workers. 
 
Groups 
casual 
workers 
Wage 
(basic rate) 
Overtime 
(weekdays) 
per hour 
Overtime 
(weekends) 
per hour 
Night 
allowance 
(weekdays) 
Night 
allowance 
(weekends) 
G1 21,897 4106 5274 11,055 27,625 
G2 24,177 4533 6044 12,205 30,510 
G3 26,370 4944 6593 13,310 33,281 
G4 28,612 5348 7153 14,444 36,110 
G5 30,898 5793 7725 15,597 38,994 
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